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ABSTRACT

Kang, Eunjoo. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2016. Consumers’ Responses to
Hotels’ Dynamic Pricing During Hedonic vs. Utilitarian Events. Major Professor: Sandra
Sydnor.
This dissertation consists of three essays on the topic of consumers’ response to
hotel room rates increases due to external events (hedonic and utilitarian situations).
External events such as sporting games, local festivals, or weather-related events (e.g.,
floods, snowstorms) frame consumers’ motivation to stay in a hotel room (hedonic vs.
utilitarian motivations), increasing hotel room demand and resulting in higher room rates.
The dynamic changes of hotel room rates during the high demand periods may cause
consumers to perceive high room rates as unfair, restricting their intentions or enhancing
their desires to book a hotel room before room rates increase even higher. Thus, it is vital
to understand the impact of external event characteristics as well as the level of
involvement on consumers’ responses to hotel room rate increases. These three papers
examine the contextual impact of external events and individual level of involvement on
the relationship among price increases, consumers’ perceived fairness and unfairness and
their booking intentions.
The first paper measures perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness
as separate constructs using the two-step measurement: 1) a binary scale to identify the
direction (fair or unfair), and 2) an ordinal scale to capture the magnitude of perceived
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fairness/unfairness separately. It then examines the effect of consumers’ trip motivation
(hedonic vs. utilitarian) on their perceived price fairness/unfairness and their booking
intentions in dynamic hotel room pricing. The results demonstrate that the magnitude of
price increases and trip motivations (hedonic vs utilitarian motivation) influence the level
of perceived unfairness, but not perceived fairness. The findings also empirically verify
the concept of separability of perceived fairness and unfairness, calling into question
whether a continuum scale of perceived fairness-unfairness (very unfair – very fair) is
appropriate to use in measuring perceived price fairness.
The second study proposes bivariate measurements of perceived fairness and
unfairness to verify the conceptual and empirical independence of perceived fairness and
perceived unfairness. The results reveal that consumers can have ambivalent perceptions
of fairness and unfairness, and may not necessarily see something as either fair or unfair.
Unlike the results of the first study, these results reveal that the magnitude of price
increases and external situation (hedonic vs. utilitarian situations) influence both
perceived fairness and unfairness. However, the results indicate fairness perceptions are
the more powerful drivers of booking intentions than unfair perceptions.
The third study examines the moderating role consumer involvement plays in the
relationship among price increases, perceived fairness and unfairness, and hotel booking
intentions. The results show that low-involved consumers are more sensitive to price
changes in perceptions of price fairness and their fairness perceptions have a stronger
effect on booking intentions than high-involved ones. For high-involvement consumers,
the relationship between unfairness perceptions and booking intentions is stronger than it

xiii
is for low-involved consumers. The findings show that the moderating effect of
involvement is significant only in the utilitarian situation.
The three studies highlight the distinction between consumers’ perceived price
fairness and perceived unfairness. Consumers may have both fair and unfair perceptions
at the same time. The results show that consumers’ perceived fairness is the more
powerful driver in booking intentions. If consumers have somewhat ambivalent
perceptions, fairness perceptions influence booking intentions. Therefore, hotel
management might consider promoting perceived fairness rather than ignoring perceived
unfairness because it exerts a more powerful influencer on booking intentions.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation has been written in a non-traditional format. In this format,
chapter one offers an overall introduction to the dissertation. This is followed by three
essays in chapter two, three, and four. These three essays will be submitted to a research
journal for publication. Finally, the last chapter discusses the overall results and
conclusions, as well as the findings relevant to the hypotheses tested to guide this study.
This non-traditional format then follows with a comprehensive list of all references used
in chapters one through five and any relevant appendix materials.

1.1

Introduction

Hotel revenue management (hereafter RM) refers to the successful management
technique of “allocating the right type of capacity to the right kind of customer at the
optimal price so as to maximize revenue” (Kimes, 1989, p. 15). Based on demand
forecast, hotels adjust room rates, increasing rates during times of high demand to control
actual demand and decreasing rates during times of low demand to promote (attract)
demand. The core of RM is this demand-driven pricing which violates the principle of
fair price, also known as “Dual Entitlement” (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). Dual
entitlement delineates that any price increases to take advantage of surplus demand is
considered unfair (Kahneman et al., 1986). Based on the consensus on this dual
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entitlement, consumers’ price fairness perceptions have functioned as a constraint on
hotels’ decisions to increases prices and restricted the their capability to maximize
revenue.
However, RM’s dynamic pricing has become an important strategic technique in
spite of the inherent price fairness perceptions of consumers. As hotel consumers become
exposed to and familiar with dynamic pricing, the expectation is that consumers
conventionally might expect hotel room rates to fluctuate according to changes in
demand. It has now become customary for hotels to set higher room rates during
weekend (in resort areas) and peak seasons, and lower room rates on weekdays and in off
seasons. Further, we often observe that hotels increase room rates even higher than
normal peak seasons during special events (e.g., Olympics, Super Bowl, Film Festivals,
etc.) and during or after a severe weather or accident (e.g., airport closure due to the
Asiana Airline crash in San Francisco airport in 2013). However, it is unclear whether or
how much consumers perceive such price increases as fair.
Previous literature suggests that the core factors of RM’s dynamic pricing that
stimulate consumers’ price unfairness perceptions may be the magnitude of price
increases and external events that increase demand. This study uses a scenario
experiment to manipulate the most plausible situations in the hotel industry, that is, price
increases in the case of a sporting event and a severe weather event. These situations
represent hedonic and utilitarian situations that give consumers a hedonic or utilitarian
motivation to book a hotel. For example, consumers in a sporting event situation would
book a hotel to enjoy a hedonic value (watching a sports game), while consumers in a
utilitarian event would book a hotel for the utility of a hotel stay. This dissertation aims to
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examine the consumers’ perceived price fairness and behavioral responses toward price
increases caused by a hedonic vs. utilitarian event.
The most important concern of this dissertation is to resolve the limitations in the
measurement of perceived price fairness. Many studies have addressed the conceptual
difference between perceived fairness and unfairness (Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004). The
continuum bipolar scale(s) (very unfair – very fair) or unidirectional Likert scale(s)
(strongly disagree- strongly agree) which have been predominately used to measure
perceived price fairness cannot fully reflect such conceptual difference. In addition, on a
bipolar scale, the meaning of the neutral point varies depending on different respondents
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961).
The first study measures perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness
as separate constructs. As recommended by Dolnicar (2013), this study employs a twostep measurement: 1) a binary scale to identify the direction (fair or unfair), and 2) an
ordinal scale to capture the direction and the magnitude of the perceived fairness and
perceived unfairness. To ensure the direction and the magnitude of perceived price
fairness and perceived price unfairness, perceived price unfairness was measured using a
numerical scale. Using multiple types of measurement, the first study examines the effect
of price increases in hedonic vs. utilitarian situations and its effect on consumers’
behavioral response.
The second study proposes the bivariate structure of perceived price fairness and
perceived price unfairness. The conventional bipolar measurement method cannot
sufficiently explain neutrality or represent ambivalent valence of positive and negative
evaluative processes (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994). For example, when a hotel room rate
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for a professional baseball game night is expected to increase up to $200 (from the
average rate of $100), and the actual room rate is $160, how do consumers evaluate this
price increase? It may be perceived as fair because it is less than the expected price by
$40. But it may also be considered as unfair because it is $60 more than the usual rate.
The bipolar structure of perceived fairness measurement cannot capture such mixed
perceptions (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994). Thus, the second study uses bivariate
measurement to assess the effect of price increases on perceived fairness/unfairness
independently, and examines the impact of perceived fairness and unfairness on booking
intentions using the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). In doing so, the moderating
effect of hedonic and utilitarian situations on the research relationship is also
investigated.
The third study examines the moderating role of consumers’ involvement on the
relationship among price increases, perceived price fairness/unfairness, and booking
intentions. The benefit of employing the bivariate measurement of perceived fairness and
unfairness is that it allows the research to identify inconsistent behavioral responses
(Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994), unlike the bipolar scale where behavioral conflicts
observed in consumer behavior such as “unfair price but willing to purchase” are hard to
identify because conflicts are conceptualized as mutually exclusive (Cacioppo &
Bernston, 1994).
Although hotel room rates and the external situations that cause price increases
are the focal cues for consumers to evaluate fairness, unfairness, or both, each consumer
has his/her subjective standard to evaluate the offered price based on their level of
involvement in the situation (Chandrashekaran, 2012). Thus, the third study extends the
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research model to include the consumers’ involvement as a moderator to examine how
the degree of involvement impacts the relationship among price increases, perceived
price fairness/unfairness, and booking intentions.

1.2

Objectives of the Study

The purpose of this dissertation is to resolve the following limitations of prior
research: 1) the limitation of using bipolar measurement for price fairness perceptions, 2)
the lack of research on the relationships among price increases, consumers’ price fairness
perceptions, and behavioral intentions, 3) the limited research on the role of hedonic and
utilitarian situations in perceived price fairness/unfairness and booking intentions, and 4)
the lack of extant research on the moderating role of involvement in the relationship
between price fairness perceptions and behavioral response. To address these limitations,
this dissertation has four objectives:
1) Identify an appropriate method to measure consumers’ perceived price
fairness and unfairness,
2) Articulate relationships amongst price increases, consumers’ perceived price
fairness, perceived price unfairness, and booking intentions,
3) Investigate the role of hedonic and utilitarian situations on consumers’
response to price increases, and
4) Investigate the moderating role of consumers’ involvement on the relationship
among price increases, perceived fairness/unfairness, and booking intentions.
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Prior to examining the relationships, it is critical to find an appropriate
measurement model for consumers’ price fairness perceptions that will sufficiently
capture the complicated perceptions on hotel dynamic pricing in hedonic and utilitarian
situations. For empirical analysis and hypothesis testing, this dissertation uses the same
scenario to manipulate experimental stimuli of price increases consistently (five levels of
price increases: $20, $40, $60, $80, and $100) in hedonic (i.e., sporting event) and
utilitarian (i.e., severe weather) events. Using the same manipulation across the three
studies allows the authors to test and compare the measurement model of perceived price
fairness and unfairness, and to examine the relationships among price increases,
perceived price fairness and unfairness, and booking intentions.

1.3

Significance of the Study

The present study attempts to examine the distinction between perceived fairness
and perceived unfairness. Unlike previous research which used a bipolar scale(s) (very
unfair – very fair) or Likert scale (strongly disagree – strongly agree on the treatment
object) to measure the perceived fairness and unfairness along one continuum, this study
uses the separable constructs of perceived fairness and unfairness. The separable
constructs of fairness and unfairness allow this research to articulate the relationships
between fairness and booking intentions as well as between unfairness and booking
intentions. The combined three studies reveal the various effects of fairness and
unfairness on consumers booking intentions depending on different situations (hedonic
vs. utilitarian) and consumers’ high or low level of involvement.
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The first study uses a two-step method to measure consumers’ perceived fairness
and unfairness separately, and conducts ANOVA and regression analysis to examine the
relationship. The second study uses bivariate measurement to test the functional
independency between perceived price fairness and unfairness and conducts SEM to
analyze the structural relationship. The third study uses the same model used in the
second study to test the moderating role of consumers’ involvement in the research model
and to extend the analysis to compare the moderating role of consumer’s involvement
between hedonic and utilitarian situations.
From the theoretical perspective, the three studies utilize reference pricing theory
in examining consumers’ fairness perceptions and behavioral response toward hotels’
dynamic pricing, which provides a meaningful guideline for future research. The
combined research challenges the predominate application of fair price principal of “dual
entitlement” in the hotel industry, providing evidence that demand driven price increases
are acceptable at the different levels depending on consumers’ trip purpose (hedonic or
utilitarian purposes) and their level of involvement in the given situations.
From the methodological perspective, this dissertation contributes to the scholarly
work on measurements of perceived fairness and unfairness by providing empirical
evidence that perceived fairness and unfairness are distinguishable and functionally
independent. This study suggests that bivariate measurements enable researchers to
sufficiently measure consumers’ whole range of perceptions of perceived fairness and
unfairness including the ambivalent perceptions of fairness and unfairness. Using the
bivariate measurement, this study identifies the superior influence of fairness perceptions
rather than unfairness perceptions on consumers’ booking intentions.
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This study also has practical implications for hotels. Better understanding about
consumers’ bivariate nature of perceived fairness and unfairness enables hotel owner /
managers to set a marketing strategy during high demand period (high room rate period),
promoting consumer’s perceived fairness rather than reducing consumers’ perceived
unfairness. Counter-intuitive contextual (hedonic and utilitarian) insights should yield
novel opportunities for relationship and transactional marketing options in the hotel
industry as well as the local destination management industry. In addition, the role of
consumers’ involvement could help hotels leverage new customer service opportunities.
Finally, this research assists in promoting collaborative work amongst hotel business,
destination management and local government.
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CHAPTER 2. STUDY 1: HEDONIC AND UTILITARIAN TRIP PURPOSE AND
CONSUMERS’ PERCEIVED PRICE UNFAIRNESS IN DYNAMIC HOTEL
ROOM PRICING

The following article will be submitted to the International Journal of Hospitality
Management and is included here as chapter two in this non-traditional
thesis/dissertation. This article is written in APA style format.

2.1

Abstract

This study explores the effects of consumers’ trip purpose (hedonic versus
utilitarian) on their views of price unfairness in dynamic hotel room pricing. The results
showed that consumers whose trip purpose was utilitarian perceived the price increases as
being more unfair than consumers whose trip purpose was hedonic. This research also
reconsiders the separable constructs of perceived price fairness and perceived price
unfairness. Consumers’ trip purpose was found to have a significant effect on perceived
price unfairness but not on perceived price fairness. This finding empirically verifies the
concept of separability of perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness, calling
into question whether a bi-polar continuum scale of perceived unfairness (extremely
unfair – extremely fair) is appropriate to use in measuring perceived price unfairness.
Consumers’ perceived price unfairness restricted consumers’ willingness to pay for those
who had a utilitarian trip purpose but not for those who had a hedonic trip purpose. On
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the other hand, consumers’ perceived price fairness was associated with positive booking
intentions for those who had a hedonic trip purpose but not for those who had utilitarian
trip purpose. These findings suggest that hotels have greater pricing flexibility for
consumers who have a hedonic trip purpose than for consumers who have a utilitarian
trip purpose.
Key words: hedonic vs. utilitarian trip purpose, hotels’ dynamic pricing, perceived price
unfairness, perceived fair price, and WTP

2.2

Introduction

A threat to hotels’ dynamic pricing is consumers’ perceived price unfairness
(Choi & Mattila, 2003; Heo & Lee, 2009). Dynamic pricing practices are primarily
driven by demand, which violates the principle of fair price, or “dual entitlement.” Dual
entitlement proposes that both buyers and sellers are implicitly entitled to their reference
price and reference profit, respectively. Many researchers have found conceptual and
empirical evidence that consumers think of price increases driven by demand as being
unfair (Campbell, 1999; Heo, Lee, & Matila, 2013; Maxwell, 2002). Therefore,
consumers’ perceived unfairness has been considered a constraint on a hotel’s decision to
increase prices and may restrict the hotel’s capability to maximize profit.
Dynamic pricing by hotels has become an important strategic instrument in spite
of the issues inherent in perceived unfairness (Chung & Petrick, 2015; Haddad, Hallak, &
Assaker, 2015). In fact, most hotels take advantage of market conditions in high season
by raising room rates to maximize revenue. During a professional sporting event or
severe weather condition, for example, consumers are willing to pay a premium for a
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hotel room even while considering the increased price to be unfair. An interesting
question to ask is if consumers perceive an increased room rate to be unfair when they
expect the room rates to increase. When people plan to book a hotel so that they can
attend a favorite sporting event or seek needed accommodation alternatives, do they
respond differently to the price increase? This research explored how consumers
responded to price increases when they expected price increases during high demand
periods. Contextual differences such as hedonic versus utilitarian trip purpose were
examined based on how consumers’ trip purpose affected the perceived price unfairness
toward the price increases and the effect of this perceived price unfairness on their
booking intentions and willingness to pay.
Many studies have addressed only the conceptual difference between perceived
unfairness and perceived fairness (Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004). This research empirically
examines the distinction between perceived fairness and perceived unfairness by
measuring them as separate constructs. As recommended by Dolinicar (2013), this study
employs a two-step measurement: 1) a binary scale to identify the direction (fair or
unfair), and 2) an ordinal scale to capture the magnitude of attitudes. To ensure the
direction and the magnitude of the perceived fairness and unfairness, individuals’
numeric value for their internal reference price is measured and compared to the external
reference price (treatment factor of price increases), calculating the numeric level of the
perceived fairness (fair price > external reference price) and unfairness (fair price <
external reference price).
Much literature is devoted to identifying factors that influence consumers’ price
fairness perceptions in response to hotel’s dynamic pricing. However, relatively little
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research examines the relationship between perceived fairness and behavioral response.
Most previous literature used a bipolar (s) scale (very unfair – very fair) or Likert scale
(strongly disagree- strongly agree on the treatment object) to measure the fairness
perceptions in the one continuum structure. Employing the separable constructs of
perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness allows the current research to
articulate the relationship between perceived fairness and booking intentions and between
perceived unfairness and booking intentions.
This research had three objectives: 1) to investigate the effect of hedonic vs.
utilitarian trip purposes on consumers’ perceptions of price unfairness in response to
price increases; 2) to empirically distinguish between perceived unfairness and perceived
fairness; and 3) to examine the effects of perceived unfairness and perceived fairness on
consumers’ booking intentions and willingness to pay.
This study’s identification of a consumer’s purpose for a hotel stay with the
perceived price unfairness yielded important theoretical and managerial implications.
Theoretically, this study contributes to the scholarly work on strategic pricing by
providing empirical evidence that a consumer’s trip purpose has an effect on his or her
perceived price unfairness about hotels’ dynamic pricing. Further, this study empirically
verifies the separable constructs of perceived price fairness and perceived price
unfairness in order to show the importance of perceived price unfairness in consumers’
behavioral responses toward hotels’ dynamic pricing. Finally, the results of this study
provide managerial insights that may help those in the hotel industry in pricing hotel
room rates during peak seasons caused by external events such as hedonic and utilitarian
events.
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2.3
2.3.1

Literature Review

Hedonic versus Utilitarian Purpose of a Hotel Stay

The hotel market is very sensitive to external events such as sporting events, mega
events, cultural events, and disaster-related events (e.g., severe weather, airplane crashes,
etc.) which frame consumers’ motivations to book a hotel room. Depending on the
external event, consumers’ purposes for hotel stays may be categorized as having a
hedonic and/or a utilitarian value (Wakefield & Inman, 2003). For example, during a
sporting event, consumers travel and book a hotel stay with intentions to enjoy the game
and the fun environment (hedonic purpose), whereas during a severe weather related
event, consumers may seek a hotel room as a form of alternative housing (utilitarian
purpose).
Hedonic value is defined as an affective experiential process, or the seeking of
fun, pleasure, recreation, and fantasy (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982; Holbrook &
Hirschman, 1982). Utilitarian value stems from a cognitive problem-solving process, in
which consumers make their decision based on a more logical information process to
satisfy their needs (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982). Usually hotel stays have been
categorized as appealing to both hedonic and utilitarian values depending on the hotel’s
classification. A stay in a luxury or an upscale hotel can be assessed based on consumers’
hedonic-influenced motivations, whereas a hotel stay in a midscale or economy hotel can
be assessed based on utilitarian motivations. Although each property might be either
hedonic or utilitarian, the primary purpose of a hotel stay may be situationally affected by
a particular external situation.
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As research has shown, situational contexts impact consumers responses to price
increases (Monroe, 2003; 2012). Wakefield and Inman (2003) found that consumers’
price sensitivity was different when consumers had hedonic versus utilitarian motivation.
With hedonic motivation, consumers considered the experience to be a higher priority
than the money (Holbrook & Hirschman, 1982), meaning that consumers were less
sensitive to price. When consumers pursued a hedonic experience, they tended to make
decisions based on positive emotions (e.g., fun, excitement, and pleasure), which might
make them willing to pay extra for a product or service (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982;
Wakefield & Inman, 2003).
On the other hand, with utilitarian motivation, consumers were more sensitive to
price (Wakefield & Inman, 2003) and thus were thinking logically when they made
purchasing decisions (i.e. hotel booking), as illustrated by the information processing
model (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982). Thus, consumers may have a different perceived
price value for their consumption experience (hotel stay) depending on their hedonic
versus utilitarian purpose even though they are purchasing the same service (a hotel stay).
In the same vein, it is likely that consumers’ perceived price fairness could also be
different when consumers had a hedonic or a utilitarian purpose when they booked a
hotel.

H1 .

Consumers whose trip purpose was utilitarian perceive price increases to be
more unfair than consumers whose trip purpose was hedonic.
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2.3.2

Reference Price: Perceived Fair Price

When consumers make a fair judgment, they activate reference prices
(Kalyanaram & Winder, 1995; Xia et al., 2004), which includes internal reference prices
and external reference prices. Internal reference prices are stored in people’s memory
(Biswas & Blair, 1991) based on the price they paid previously or their most frequently
paid price. Internal reference is referred to as “expected or fair price” (Thaler, 1985).
External prices are described by terms such as a market price, advertised price, observed
price, and actual price. When consumers are exposed to an external reference price
(actual price), they tend to recall the internal reference price in their memory when
evaluating the actual price to see if it is fair or not (Monroe, 2003). The price
discrepancies between internal reference price and external reference price affect
perceived price unfairness (Monroe, 2012; Xia et al., 2004).
The internal reference price (perceived fair price) is the consumers’ subjective
perceptions of price, which is affected by a variety of situations and conditions (Monroe,
2003). This concept is theoretically supported by adaptation theory which states that the
external reference price adjusts the internal reference price according to the adaptation
level of the price, depending on contextual factors (Kalyanaram & Winder, 1995;
Monroe, 2003). This concept can be illustrated using a hotel-booking situation. Since
most people have been exposed to the practice of dynamic pricing in the hotel industry,
they may expect price fluctuations driven by external events. When consumers book a
hotel room so they can attend a sporting event, they will have a higher reference price for
fair price than when they book a hotel room as alternative housing. Prior to checking the
hotel pricing information, they may anticipate an expected hotel room rate.
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According to adaptation theory, once consumers are exposed to the actual price,
their perceived fair price will change. Since any stimuli for price increases are considered
undesirable (Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2003), it is reasonable to assume that the
external reference price limits the perceived fair price.
Based on the subjective characteristics of the internal reference price, we
hypothesized that:

H2.

A perceived fair price is different depending on consumers’ trip purpose. When
consumers have a hedonic trip purpose, the perceived fair prices are higher than
when they have a utilitarian trip purpose.

H3.

The external reference price adjusts to consumers’ perceived fair price. When
consumers are exposed to the external reference price, consumers change their
perceived fair price.

2.3.3 Separability of Perceived Price Fairness versus Perceived Price Unfairness
Several researchers have shown that perceived unfairness is conceptually different
from perceived fairness because perceived unfairness is clearer and sharper. Further,
consumers are more able to clearly articulate the causal antecedents and consequences of
perceived unfairness than they are those of perceived fairness (Haws & Bearden, 2006;
Xia et al., 2004). Unfair situations are more salient (Adams, 1963; Kanouse, 1984) and
more distinctly remembered than fair ones (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) because unfair events
are phenomenologically associated with a sense of loss while fair events are associated
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with gain (Lupfer, Weeks, Doan, & Houston, 2000). According to prospect theory, the
effects of loss are more noticeably felt than the effects of gain. This phenomenon is
termed “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and it has been
empirically applied to perceived unfairness and fairness (Kalapurakal, et al., 1991).
Prospect theory can also be applied to hotel customers’ transactions. When a
consumer perceives the published hotel price to be fair, he/she might evaluate the deal as
a gain. In contrast, when a consumer perceives the published hotel price to be unfair,
he/she might interpret those feelings as loss. As in asymmetric loss aversion, perceived
fairness and perceived unfairness are asymmetrical (Oh, 2003). Even though many
researchers have suggested that perceived unfairness is different from perceived fairness,
perceived price fairness and unfairness have usually been measured on bipolar continuum
scales: for example, fair (extremely fair – extremely unfair), reasonable (extremely
reasonable – extremely unreasonable), and acceptable (extremely acceptable – extremely
unacceptable) (Bolton, Warlop et al. 2003, Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). The
popular practice of using a bipolar scale in the same continuum is anchored by the two
extremes, which may yield concrete results but cause biased results as well. Cacioppo
and Bernston claimed that neither negative nor positive evaluative activation could be
measured on a bipolar continuum scale (1994).
Perceived price fairness cannot be an issue until consumers perceive a given price
to be unfair (Xia et al., 2004). Perceived price unfairness is a clearer response to any
antecedent and it also invokes a more salient behavioral response than perceived price
fairness (Lupfer et al., 2000). Therefore, it is critical for researchers to distinguish
perceived price unfairness from perceived price fairness prior to identifying problems and
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solutions to reduce the tension of perceived unfairness in an exchange relationship
(Adams, 1963). Based on this discussion, we hypothesized that

H4 .

The effect of price increases on perceived price unfairness is stronger than one on

perceived price fairness.

2.3.4

Effect of Perceived Unfairness and Fairness on Behavioral Responses

Many studies have posited that perceived unfairness negatively influences
purchase intentions (Campbell, 1999; Homburg, Hoyer, & Koschate, 2005; Maxwell,
2002) even though there are certain situations in which consumers begrudgingly pay
prices they consider unfair (e.g., dining at a resort restaurant, buying ice water at a beach
bar.) (Okun, 1981). Professional sporting events and weather related events can be
examples of situations that may lead consumers to book a hotel unwillingly or to pay
unfair prices. It is more difficult to determine consumers’ perceived price unfairness
within the context of a hotel stay than it is in other consumption situations because a hotel
stay is not only categorized as product/service consumption, but also considered in terms
of its temporal and spatial value. In other words, the event date and the location where the
event occurs limit a hotel stay during a certain event. Therefore, the value of a hotel stay
is not simply calculated by the monetary prices that consumers pay. Their purpose for a
hotel stay is determined by the characteristics of the event they are attending (pleasure
seeking or work-related). As such, consumers’ booking intentions and the level of
willingness to pay for a hotel stay vary depending on the perceived fairness or unfairness
within the particular situation.
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For example, when people want to attend a sporting event, they are less sensitive
to price increases and consider the price increases to be fair. This positive attitude toward
the given situation affects their booking intentions and willingness to pay extra to seek
the pleasure that they expect to have from attending the game (Thaler, 1985). In other
cases, when people desperately need a place to stay because they are unable to remain at
home, they may use ethical criteria that impute the price increases to be unfair, which
negatively affects their booking intentions and willingness to pay. Based on this logic, we
hypothesized that:

H5 .

For consumers whose trip purpose is utilitarian, perceived price unfairness has a
stronger effect on behavioral responses (booking intentions and WTP) than
perceived price fairness.

H6 .

For consumers whose trip purpose is hedonic, perceived price fairness has a
stronger effect on behavioral responses (booking intentions and WTP) than
perceived price unfairness.

2.4
2.4.1

Methodology
Research Design

A scenario-based experiment was used to test consumers’ responses to hotel price
increases (this included five levels of price increases: $20, $40, $60, $80, and $100) when
they had hedonic versus utilitarian hotel staying purposes (sporting events vs. alternative
housing) in a midscale hotel (e.g. Ramada, La Quinta, Howard Johnson, etc.). These
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situations were designed to represent situations that drive consumers with a hedonic or a
utilitarian motivation to book a hotel. For example, consumers in a sporting event would
book a hotel to enjoy the hedonic value (watching a sports game), while consumers in a
utilitarian event would book a hotel for the utility of a hotel stay.
A pretest was conducted to identify the price level that consumers would expect
in the given scenarios. The participants were asked to indicate a reasonable price range
(the lowest reasonable price and the highest acceptable price) for both hedonic and
utilitarian cases. The results of the pretest (N=40) showed that, at a hotel located in the
downtown area of a mid-size metropolitan city with an annual average room rate of $100,
consumers’ highest expected room rate was $126.56 for an alternative housing situation
(a utilitarian situation) and $173.71 for a sporting event (a hedonic purpose). In addition,
we reviewed the Smith Travel Research Center’s (STR) census data and found that
during Super Bowl XLVI, hotels in Indianapolis increased room rates up to 230% from
those of the previous year and during Hurricane Ike, hotels in Texas increased room rates
up to 50% from the previous year. Therefore, five levels of magnitude of price increases
($20, $40, $60, $80, and $100) were generated to test consumer response; these covered
the highest expected prices for both hedonic and utilitarian trip purpose situations
(sporting versus severe weather events). To verify the appropriate level of price increases,
each respondent was asked to indicate his/her internal reference price (the highest fair
price).
The utilitarian scenario was carefully created using the case of a flood. We used
this example due to the frequent occurrence of floods. In cases of severe weather, there
are laws against price gouging that restrict price increases when a federal or state
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emergency is declared. However, price gouging laws are not part of federal law, but
rather state law. Price gouging laws are not ubiquitous; however, 34 states and the
District of Columbia currently have anti-price gouging laws and the specific regulations
differ in each state (Giberson, 2011). This research scenario uses the case of a flood,
which frequently occurs and is not considered to be a disaster nor to be involved with an
emergency. Floods that only affect local areas are not usually covered by price gouging
laws.

The test scenarios were as follows:
Hedonic hotel stay purpose scenario:
Imagine that you are planning a trip to watch your favorite professional football
team play. You plan to stay the night. You have identified a mid-scale hotel where
you want to stay and you know that the average room rate for this hotel is $100.
But because of the football game, the hotel is expected to be fully booked on the
night of your stay. When you are trying to book a room, you find out that the rates
are $120/$140/$160/$180/$200 per night.

Utilitarian hotel stay purpose scenario:
Imagine that your neighborhood is flooded and your house has lost power due to a
storm. You are planning to stay in a hotel for the night to avoid the inconvenience
of staying in your home without power. You have identified a mid-scale hotel
where you want to stay for the night and you know that the average room rate for
this hotel is $100. But because this hotel has not been affected by the storm, the
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hotel is expected to be fully booked for the night of your stay. When you are
trying to book a room, you find the rates are $120/$140 / $160 / $180 / $200 per
night.

In order to identify consumers’ internal reference rates (fair price) and their
willingness to pay in the given hedonic and utilitarian scenarios, two additional cells were
created as control groups. We provided the annual average price information ($100) and
the tested situations (sporting event and flood) only. These control groups were asked to
list their perceived fair price as well as their willingness to pay which are not affected by
hotel’s increased room rate.
When creating an experimental design, it is critical for researchers to randomly
assign a sample in each experiment to control for unwanted bias and unobserved
variables (Kirk, 2014), as well as to determine the precise causal relationship (Wikinson,
1999). Therefore, this study used a completely randomized block design with one
treatment of five levels of price increases in two blocks (hedonic versus utilitarian hotel
stay purposes). Each survey participant was randomly assigned to 1 of 12 different
scenarios (including two control cells) and was asked about his/her perception of the
given circumstance and behavioral intentions in response to the given situation. This
research employed an Internet survey website which we restricted to U.S. residents only.

2.4.2

Variables and Analytical Procedures

The questionnaire consisted of three sections. The first section was the scenario.
After reading a randomly assigned scenario, participants were asked to mark their
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perceived price fairness in the given situation. The predominant method for measuring
perceived price fairness and unfairness is to use a same continuum scale: fair (extremely
(very) unfair – extremely (very) fair), reasonable (extremely unreasonable – extremely
reasonable), and acceptable (extremely unacceptable – extremely acceptable) (Bolton,
2003; Xia et al., 2004).
However, in our analysis, we avoided using bipolar continuum scales and instead
used three different scales – binary, ordinal, and numeric – to more rigorously measure
perceived fairness and unfairness toward price increases. Although bipolar continuum
scales are useful for capturing direction and magnitude, its confounding of direction and
magnitude causes a tendency to choose middle answer options (Dolnicar, 2013; Roster,
Rogers, Hozier, Baker, & Albaum, 2007). Dolnicar (2013) suggested a combination of a
binary and a Likert scale to capture the direction and the magnitude separately in a quick
and simple way.
Once respondents read the scenario, they stated their position toward the given
price increase as fair or unfair. This information was coded as a binary variable (‘0’ for
fair and ‘1’ for unfair), indicating the direction. A binary response is considered to be the
most accurate means to obtain an estimate of the parameter values (Chalonder & Larntz,
1989). The subsequent question extended the binary variable to a 5 point Likert scale (1:
neutral – 5: extremely fair (or unfair). Respondents who judged the given situation as
unfair determined the level of perceived unfairness, while those who judged the given
situation as fair determined the level of perceived fairness. The difference between
responses on a continuum scale of perceived fairness measurement (very unfair – very
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fair) and responses on the sequential perceived fairness and perceived unfairness
measurements were treated as two separate constructs.

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑥3𝑖 for those who judged the given situation unfair
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 𝑥2𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑥3𝑖 for those who judged the given situation fair

Next, perceived fairness was measured using a numerical scale. Respondents were
asked their perceived fair price for the given scenario (“What price would you consider to
be fair?”). A consumer’s perceived fair price is regarded as a consumer’s internal
reference price in a given situation (Thaler, 1985). Perceived price unfairness
conceptually defines the deviation between external reference price and internal reference
price (Xia et al., 2004). To obtain a numerical scale of perceived price unfairness, we
subtracted internal price (fair price) from experimental scenario price (treatment price). If
a fair price was higher than the treatment price, this was considered to be perceived
fairness. If a fair price was lower than the treatment price, this was considered to be
perceived unfairness.
The second section included questions intended to assess the participants’
potential behavioral responses, including booking intentions and willingness to pay
(hereafter: WTP). WTP was used in measuring the maximum monetary value a consumer
would agree to pay (Miller et al., 2011) in order to obtain a hotel room in the given
situation. In this section, respondents were asked, “What is the highest rate you would be
willing to pay under the described circumstance?” and a scale bar between $0 and $400
was provided. Since consumers often perceive all higher prices to be undesirable
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(Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2003), we used the phrase “the highest rate” in the
questionnaire to measure the realistic range of WTP.
The final section assessed the participants’ demographic variables (i.e., gender,
age, education, marital status, annual household income, and employment). At the end of
the survey, we added a question in order to verify whether each respondent fully
understood the given situation. If respondents chose the wrong answer, we assumed that
these respondents were not qualified to participate in the project and so we did not
include their answers.
To analyze causal effect price increases in hedonic versus utilitarian situations
concerning consumers’ perceived (un)fairness, we used a logistic regression analysis of
the binary dependent variable on the judgment of “fair or unfair” and an ANOVA test to
obtain the level of perceived unfairness and fairness. To analyze the extended
relationship between perceived price unfairness and consumers’ behavioral responses,
this study used Ordinal Least Squares (OLS) regression.

2.5
2.5.1

Results

Respondents’ Profiles and Random Assignment of Scenarios

A total of 638 surveys were collected from the Internet survey service, Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online survey service with approximately
500,000 voluntary individuals, referred to as “workers,” who participate in a survey in
return for payment (Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2014). MTurk has large sample pools that
are demographically diverse (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri,
2012). Data quality obtained from MTurk is considered to be as reliable as that from
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conventional sampling methods (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Survey participants are
required to be at least 18 years old and residents of the United States. Each participant’s
location information (longitude and latitude) was obtained and imported to ArcGIS
Mapping application (www.arcgis.com) to verify participant’ residence in the United
States.
After screening out surveys that failed the verification question and eliminating
the surveys with missing data, we were able to use 603 responses for the analysis.
Outliers were retained, as Kirk (2013) recommended, because outliers reflect the random
variability inherent in a completely randomized assignment. Table 1 includes the
descriptive statistics of the random assignment for each scenario and indicates that the
samples were almost equally assigned to each scenario. Within the 12 cells, 2 cells were
control groups showing the internal reference price as the fair price and WTP both in a
hedonic and a utilitarian situation. These two control groups were not used to test our
hypothesis but they did verify that the magnitude of price increases included consumers’
expected internal reference price in both situations.

Table 2.1 Random Assignment for the Scenarios
Price increases
N=603
No price1

+$20

+$40

+$60

+$80

+$100

Subtotal

Hedonic

51

47

50

52

49

53

302

Utilitarian

52

50

48

52

49

50

301

Subtotal

103

97

98

104

98

103

603

Note: 1. Control groups where no price information was given.
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Table 2.2 Respondents’ Demographics (N=603)
Characteristics

Freq.

Percent

Gender

Characteristics

Freq.

Percent

Marital Status

Male

342

56.7%

Married

183

30.3%

Female

261

43.3%

Single

413

68.5%

Other

7

1.2%

Age

Total annual household income

18-20

15

2.5%

Less than $20,000

209

34.6%

21-30

285

47.4%

$20,001 - $40,000

184

30.5%

31-40

171

28.3%

$40,001 – $60,000

102

16.9%

41-50

79

13.0%

$60,001 – $80,000

64

10.6%

51 and older

53

8.8%

More than $80,001

45

7.4%

61

10.2%

Education

Employment

High School or equivalent

167

27.7%

Student

2-year college degree

116

19.2%

Part-time employed

110

18.5%

4-year college degree

246

40.7%

Full-time employed

304

51.0%

69

11.4%

Unemployed

72

12.1%

6

1.0%

Others

49

8.2%

Graduate / Professional degree
Other

Note: Insignificant level of χ2 indicates the homogeneity of the sample distribution in each group

Table 2.2 shows the respondents’ demographics and profiles. Among the 603
valid respondents, 56.7% were male and 43.3% were female. The average age of the
respondents was 33.52 years old, and the ages ranged from 18 to 72. The average annual
household income levels indicated that 82% of the respondents had an annual household
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income of $60,000 or below and 18% had an annual income over $60,000. The sample
included 48.6 % of respondents with a high school or associate’s degree, and 51.4% with
a bachelor’s degree or higher. On average, 11.5% of the respondents had not stayed in a
hotel in the past 12 months, 67.4% of the respondents had stayed in a hotel 1 to 4 times in
the past 12 months, and 21.1% of the respondents had stayed in a hotel more than 5 times
in the past 12 months. Of the respondents, 54.1% of them usually stayed in mid-scale
hotels, 8.1% of them usually stayed in upscale and luxury hotels, and 37.8% of them
usually stayed in economy or budget hotels. Among all the respondents, 80.6% were
aware of dynamic pricing.
To ensure the randomness and homogeneity of the sample distribution in each
cell, a chi-squares test was conducted, which showed an insignificant level through all
demographic variables (𝜒 2 gender = 11.373; p > 0.05, 𝜒 2 income = 49.987, p > 0.05; 𝜒 2 age =
42.022, p > 0.05). Therefore, the data could be used to test the hypotheses.

2.5.2

Hypothesis Test

2.5.2.1 Hedonic vs. Utilitarian Trip Purpose and Perceived Price Unfairness
For the analysis, the subjects’ responses to the question of whether they would
judge a given scenario as unfair were coded as 1 = unfair and 0 = fair. The percentage of
respondents who chose “unfair” could be simply calculated as a mean of the responses
that judged a given situation as “unfair.” Figure 2.1 demonstrates the percentage of
respondents who chose unfair using five levels of price increases for a hedonic purpose
and a utilitarian purpose. Logistic regression was used to analyze the significance of the
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difference between the number of people who judged a given situation as “fair” and the
number of people who judged a given situation as “unfair.” The results showed
significant effects of price increases (𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 ; 0.032, 𝑝 < 0.001) and trip
purpose (𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑝 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 ; −.80, 𝑝 < 0.001) on consumers’ judgment of price unfairness.
This result confirmed that price increases and situations do have a significant effect on
consumers’ judgement of price unfairness. The percentage of subjects who responded
“unfair” consistently increased over the five levels of price increases, and there were
almost 20% more respondents with a utilitarian purpose than with a hedonic purpose that
judged a price increase to be “unfair.” This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and
supported H1.

Figure 2.1 Percent of Respondents Who Judged the Given Situation to Be Unfair
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2.5.2.2 Reference Price: Perceived Fair Price
H2 states that perceived fair prices are different depending on consumers’ trip
purpose. The results of t-Test show that the perceived fair prices for the hedonic trip
purpose group (Mean=$129.14, SD=24.04) and the utilitarian trip purpose group (Mean =
$ 118.86, SD=27.92) were significantly different (t-Test (601)= -5.18, p < 0.0001). This
result is illustrated in Figure 2.2 and supported H2.

Figure 2.2 Perceived Fair Price Compared by Utilitarian vs. Hedonic Trip Purpose

H3 states that the external reference price adjusts to consumers’ perceived fair
price. The results of t-Test show that perceived fair price when consumers were only
given the situational information without the external reference price (Mean= $129.97,
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SD=31.60) was significantly different (t-Test 601= 2.47, p< 0.01) from the perceived fair
price when consumers were exposed to the external price (Mean = $122.85, SD=25.22).
Therefore, H3 was supported (Figure 2.3) showing that when consumers were exposed to
external reference price, they changed their perceived fair price.

Figure 2.3 Perceived Fair Price Comparing the Control Group with the Treatment Group

2.5.2.3 Perceived Price Fairness versus Perceived Price Unfairness
Table 2.3 gives the results of a two-way ANOVA test showing that the level of
perceived price unfairness was significantly affected by both price increase (F 4, 309 =
2.96, p < 0.05) and trip purpose (F 1, 309 = 10.05, p < 0.01), while the results of the twoway ANOVA of perceived fairness showed insignificant effects of price increases (F 4, 191

32
= .99, NS) and trip purpose (F 1, 191 = .77, NS) on the level of perceived price fairness. The
results supported H4, showing that perceived price unfairness and perceived price fairness
operate differently.

Table 2.3 Two-way ANOVA of Perceived Price Unfairness
Source

Sum of squares

Model

df

Mean Square

F-statistic

Sig.

25.228

9

2.803

2.69

0.005

Price increases

12.354

4

3.088

2.96

0.020

Trip purpose

10.472

1

10.472

10.05

0.005

4..221

4

1.055

1.01

0.401

Residual

311.690

209

1.042

Total

336.919

308

1.094

Price increases x trip
purpose

N= 309; R-squared: 0.075

Additionally, we measured perceived fair price as an internal reference price in
each experimental group to calculate the discrepancy between the internal and external
reference prices, thus producing the numerical level of perceived unfairness and
perceived fairness. Perceived unfairness is calculated when the external reference price is
higher than perceived fairness, while perceived fairness is calculated when perceived
fairness is higher than the external reference price. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the
distribution of perceived unfairness and perceived fairness in each test group. As shown
in Table 4, numerically measured perceived unfairness was significantly affected by price
increases (F 1, 419 = 45.57, p < 0.001) and trip purpose (F 1, 419 = 186.67, p < 0.001), but
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numerically measured perceived fairness was not affected by price increases (F 4, 75 = .80,
NS) or trip purpose (F 1, 75 = .47, NS). Additionally, the trip purpose has an interaction
effect on the relationship between price increases and numerically measured model of
perceived unfairness (F 1, 420 = 2.55, p < 0.05).

Figure 2.4 Numeric Price Fairness and Unfairness
Note: The red line on y=0 when the observed price is equal to the perceived fair price.
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Table 2.4 Two-way ANOVA of Numerical Measured Unfairness
Source

Sum of squares

Model
Price increases
Trip purpose

df

Mean Square

F-statistic

Sig.

188170

9

20907

89.40

0.000

10890

1

10890

46.57

0.000

174620

4

43655

186.67

0.000

2383

4

595

2.55

0.039

95883

410

233

284053

419

Price increases x Trip
purpose
Residual
Total
N= 420; R-squared: 0.66

Figure 2.4 illustrates the numerically measured unfairness and fairness. When
respondents were asked to determine their position on whether the given situation was
fair or unfair, 305 respondents judged the given situation as unfair while 190 respondents
judged it as fair. However, the numerically measured unfairness (observed price –
perceived fair price) showed that 420 respondents had lower perceived fair price than
observed price (negative price discrepancy) while only 75 respondents had higher
perceived fair price than observed price (positive price discrepancy). These unmatched
distributions of fair – unfair respondents were discussed by Haw and Bearden (2006),
who demonstrated that price discrepancies do not always cause perceived price
unfairness (Figure 2.5).
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Table 2.5 N of Respondents Who Judged the Given Situation as Fair or Unfair
Measurement method
Binary scale

Unfair

Fair

305

190

420

75

105

115

Numerical scale:
Perceived fair price – Observed price < 0 : Unfair
Perceived fair price – Observed price > 0 : Fair
Difference

2.5.2.4 Perceived Price Unfairness in Consumers’ Behavioral Responses
To test the interaction effect of hedonic vs. utilitarian trip purpose on the
relationship between perceived price unfairness or fairness and consumers’ behavioral
responses, a two-way ANOVA test was conducted. The results showed that there was no
significant interaction effect of trip purpose on the relationship between perceived
unfairness and booking intentions(F 3, 309 = .43, NS) or willingness to pay (F 3, 309 = .43,
NS). Therefore, H5 was not supported.
Meanwhile, the interaction effect of trip purpose on the relationship between
perceived fairness and booking intentions was significant for the hedonic trip purpose
group but not for the utilitarian trip purpose group (𝐹 3, 191 = 3.60, p <0.05). However,
there was no significant interaction effect on the relationship between perceived fairness
and WTP (𝐹 3. 191 = 1.42, N.S). Therefore, H6 was partially supported.
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Importantly, this study revealed the different patterns of relationship among
perceived fairness, perceived unfairness, and behavioral responses. Figure 2.5 presents
four plots, illustrating the prediction of booking intentions by a) fair or unfair judgement
(binary scale), b) numerically measured price unfairness (price discrepancies), c) level of
perceived price unfairness, and d) level of perceived price fairness. These four plots
reveal that perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness operated differently
and that this phenomenon could not be uncovered when we employed the most frequently
used bipolar continuum scales of perceived unfairness.

Figure 2.5 Prediction of Booking Intentions by Different Measurements of Perceived
(Un)fairness
a.
b.
c.
d.

Booking intentions by unfairness judgement
Booking intentions by numerically measured unfairness (Observed price – perceived fair price)
Booking intentions by level of perceived unfairness
Booking intentions by level of perceived fairness
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2.5.2.5 Additional Findings
Additionally, consumers’ perceived fair price and willingness to pay were
compared. These analyses and findings are exploratory in nature and as such are findings
for which no hypotheses have been made. This study created two control groups to
identify consumers’ perceived fair price and WTP in a given situation without a price
treatment. Consumers’ perceived fair price values and WTP were measured using a
numerical scale along with a dollar value to identify consumers’ internal reference price
as well as the amount they were willing to spend to book a hotel in a given hedonic or
utilitarian situation.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the pattern of the levels of perceived fair price and WTP in
experimental conditions, including the no price treatment condition. Certain levels of the
perceived fair price of the control groups indicated that consumers already had their own
level of fair price ($122.06 in a utilitarian and $135.49 in a hedonic situation) and WTP
($139.77 in a utilitarian and $150.49 in a hedonic situation). As discussed in H2, when
respondents were offered hotel price information, they adjusted their perceived fair price
to go lower than the hotel’s published price. When respondents in the utilitarian purpose
group were exposed to a hotel’s increased price, they showed a consistent range for their
perceived fair price ($109.4 - $119.48) and for their WTP ($137.40 - $147.24), which
were not affected by price increases (F4, 246 = 1.17, p>0.05; F4, 246 = 0.82, p> 0.05). Unlike
for consumers in the utilitarian trip purpose group, those in the hedonic trip purpose
group increased their level of perceived fair price and WTP in accordance with the level
of price increases (F4, 244 = 9.71, p<0.001; F4, 244 = 4.21, p < 0.01). There were significant
differences between the hedonic versus the utilitarian trip purpose groups in terms of a
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consumer’s assessed fair price (F1, 499 = 22.89, p<0.001) although not in WTP (F 1, 498 =
1.68, p > 0.05).

Figure 2.6 Fair Price and WTP by Experimental Conditions

2.6

Conclusion

2.6.1

Discussion

The current study explored the effects of consumers’ trip purpose (hedonic versus
utilitarian) on their perceived price unfairness and fairness in dynamic hotel room pricing
during high demand time periods. By utilizing a scenario-based experiment, this study
found that hedonic vs. utilitarian trip purposes and price increases did significantly affect
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consumers’ judgement of price unfairness (H1) and perceived fair price (H2). As Figure
2.1 shows, approximately 20% more respondents who had a utilitarian purpose for their
hotel stay evaluated price increases as being unfair in comparison to respondents who had
a hedonic trip purpose. Also, consumers who had a hedonic trip purpose had a higher
internal reference price (perceived fair price) than those who had a utilitarian trip
purpose.

Table 2.6 Hypothesis Results
Hypothesis
H1

H2

H3

Consumers whose trip purpose was utilitarian perceive price
increases to be more unfair than consumers whose trip
purpose was hedonic.
Perceived fair price is different depending on consumers’ trip
purpose. When consumers have a hedonic trip purpose, the
perceived fair prices are higher than when they have a
utilitarian trip purpose.

Results
Supported

Supported

The external reference price adjusts to consumers’ perceived
fair price. When consumers are exposed to the external
reference price, consumers change their perceived fair price.

Supported

The effect of price increases on perceived price unfairness is
stronger than one on perceived price fairness.

Supported

H4

H5

H6

For consumers whose trip purpose is utilitarian, perceived
price unfairness has a stronger effect on behavioral responses Not supported
(booking intentions and WTP) than perceived price fairness.
For consumers whose trip purpose is hedonic, perceived price
fairness has a stronger effect on behavioral responses
(booking intentions and WTP) than perceived price
unfairness.

Partially
supported
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This research confirms that the external reference price adjust to consumers’
perceived fair price (internal reference price). The control groups’ perceived fair price
(without knowledge of a hotel’s published price) was higher than the test groups’
perceived fair price (after being exposed to the hotel’s published price), as illustrated in
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.6. Consumers may use a hotel’s published price to adjust their
perceived fair price to a price below the published price. The gap in perceived fair price
between the control group and the test group can serve as evidence that consumers
always consider a seller’s price increase to be unfair (Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2003).
Thus, it is critical to admit that increased price information itself may cause the perceived
price unfairness although consumers may expect price increases due to higher demand.
The most important finding in this research is the empirical evidence of the
distinction between perceived price unfairness and perceived price fairness. Many
researchers have conjectured that perceived fairness and perceived unfairness are
different constructs, but none have attempted to measure fairness and unfairness
separately. Hedonic vs. utilitarian trip purposes have been shown to have a significant
effect on perceived price unfairness but not on perceived price fairness. Interestingly,
perceived price unfairness affected consumers in the utilitarian trip purpose group and
their willingness to pay but not consumers in the hedonic trip purpose group. On the other
hand, perceived price fairness affected booking intention for those in the hedonic trip
purpose group but not in the utilitarian trip purpose group. These results empirically
distinguished perceived price unfairness from perceived price fairness, revealing that they
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operate differently. Therefore, it is reasonable to doubt that bipolar continuum scales are
appropriate to use in measuring perceived price unfairness.
This study found that, for consumers who had a utilitarian purpose, price
increases did not have a significant effect on either their perceived fair price or WTP,
unlike for consumers who had a hedonic purpose. When consumers look for a hotel for
utilitarian purposes, they might have a consistent level of perceived fair price and WTP
that are not affected by a hotel’s offered price. In contrast, when consumers look for a
hotel for hedonic purposes, although these consumers may perceive a certain level of
price increases as being unfair, their perceived fair price will be adjusted by a hotel’s
offered price. If consumers desire to stay at a hotel for a hedonic purpose, they may add
the value of a hedonic situation to a hotel stay, so they are willing to pay a premium to
book a hotel room.
In a real situation, it may be hard for hotel managers to identify consumers’
perceived price unfairness through analysis of the hotel’s booking system because the
hotel may be fully booked by consumers who have begrudgingly booked their rooms and
paid extra or by consumers who perceive the price increases to be fair. As Figure 2.4
illustrates, there were still a certain number of consumers who perceived the price
increases to be fair, but they were not the majority. During high demand periods, a
limited number of hotel rooms would likely be booked by some consumers who perceive
the price increases to be fair, while others would be occupied by consumers who booked
begrudgingly. Thus, in a real business situation, hotel managers may not need to pay
attention to consumers’ perceived price unfairness because their hotel rooms would be
fully booked anyway.
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Additionally, we tested fair price and WTP for exploratory purposes. In Figure 2.
6, consumers’ perceived fair price in a utilitarian context was $122.06, while their
perceived price was $135.49 in a hedonic context. These perceived fair prices in each
situation can be represented as the range of the perceived fair price in each situation.
Thus, hotels could increase room rates up to $22.06 in a utilitarian situation and up to
$35.49 in a hedonic situation without any concern about consumers’ perceived price
unfairness.

2.6.2

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Despite the important role that external events play in hotel pricing, the situational
context has not been highlighted in research on perceived price fairness in hotels’
dynamic pricing. Therefore, this study clearly provides an important theoretical
contribution to the literature in that it includes situational contexts within perceived price
fairness research. This study shows that consumers who had a utilitarian purpose were
more sensitive to perceived price fairness/unfairness than consumers who had a hedonic
one, which is somewhat consistent with Wakefield and Inman’s research findings
showing that consumers with utilitarian motivation showed more price sensitivity (2003).
Further, unlike previous studies which used a continuum scale of perceived
fairness and unfairness in one construct, this study measured perceived price unfairness
and fairness separately and found differences between them in regards to both price
increases and situational contexts. Another contribution of this research is our finding
that perceived price unfairness did not influence consumers’ WTP in hedonic situations.
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Our exploratory research found that consumers did expect price increases in both
hedonic and utilitarian situations. Consumers’ perceived fair price without the price
information was higher than when consumers were exposed to hotels’ published price
information, which reveals that a hotel’s published price serves as an anchor in adjusting
perceived prices down to a level lower than a hotel’s published prices. The gap between
expected fair price without price information and perceived fair price was related to
hotels’ published price. Also, consumers’ WTP without price information and the WTP
with price information were significantly different, indicating the hotel’s published price
affects consumers’ WTP as well as perceived fair price.
The present study offers several practical implications for the hotel industry. First,
findings of the study provide evidence of how consumers respond to hotel room rate
increases in regard to their fairness/unfairness perceptions and behavioral responses
depending on hedonic versus utilitarian situations. Consumers who are looking for a hotel
room to enjoy participation hedonic events perceive the price increases as being less
unfair than consumers who are looking for a hotel room as alternative housing. This
finding suggests that hotel management might have more flexibility to increase room
rates for consumers whose trip purpose is hedonic.
Second, the results show the difference in perceived fair prices between hedonic
situation and utilitarian situations, indicating that consumers expect the room rate to be
increased, on average up to $129 (from $100) for a hedonic situation and $118 (from
$100) for a utilitarian situation. 10% of consumers in a utilitarian situation and 20% of
consumers in a hedonic situation perceive price increases by $100 (from $100) as fair.
This finding indicates that 10% and 20% of consumers in utilitarian and hedonic
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situations, respectively, consider all price increases up to 100$ fair during high demand
periods although the majority (80% -90%) of consumers find price increases unfair in at
least some cases. Hotel revenue managers should consider increasing room rates
appropriately to allocate the available rooms to consumers who consider room rate
increases fair.
Third, the findings highlight the role of external events that add the value of hotel
stay. When consumers plan to book a hotel for a particular event, the hotel room value is
beyond the physical value (hotel room), adding the contextual value (Abrate & Viglia,
2016). Hotel operators and revenue management managers should fully apply dynamic
pricing as a short-term tactic to respond to excessive demand caused by the external
events and to allocate the hotel rooms to target consumers who are willing to pay a
premium for a hedonic and a utilitarian purpose.
Fourth, hotels could be more cautious when increasing room rates in response to
utilitarian situations (e.g., severe weather related event) (Wharton, 2012). It is critical for
hotel revenue managers to manage potential perceptions of what might look like price
gouging during high demand situations (Ponchione, 2012). In the case of severe weather
situations, hotel managers should treat the situation as an emergency (AlBattat & Som,
2013). In this case, it is tough for hotel managers to deal with a massive number of guests
who want to secure a hotel room as alternative housing due to severe weather as
alternative housing. If hotels increase room rate rapidly in response to the immediate
increase in demand, they may invoke consumer complaints (Thaler, 1985). However, if
hotels with limited capacity offer affordable rates for the majority of people, they could
have their rooms immediately fully booked or sold, but may lose many potential
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consumers who would be willing to pay a higher price (Giberson, 2012; Meyer, 2006).
Revenue management systems and managers must take these factors into account to
enable hotels to match available rooms with the most valued guests.
The current study also provides practical implications for CVBs (Convention and
Visitor Bureau) and local governments. Since CVB and local government receive
financial benefits from hotel room tax (Litvin, Smith, & Blackwell, 2012), they
essentially expect tax income increases when hotel room rates increase due to external
events. It is vital for CVBs and local governments to actively create hedonic events to
assist in the hotel industry in attracting more customers, increasing demand and thereby
giving hotels a chance to increase room rates. Maintaining higher room rates during
hedonic events could also help hotels keep higher reference prices, which assist hotel
revenue managers in pricing room rates during low season as well (Viglia, Mauri, &
Carricano, 2016).

2.6.3

Limitations and Recommendation for Future Studies

The current study is limited in terms of generalizability. First, this study
manipulated a hedonic and a utilitarian situation using a sporting event and a weatherrelated event. However, no manipulation check was conducted. Future research would
benefit from a manipulation check to enhance its validity. Second, this research was
designed to test consumers’ perceived price fairness for stays in a mid-scale hotel. Thus,
it is not appropriate to apply the results of this research to upscale or luxury hotel
situations. Third, the study respondents were from a fairly specific population: 90% of
the respondents usually stayed at an economy hotel or a budget hotel. This may be

46
helpful for our research because our research target was mid-scale hotels; however, this
information does limit the generalization of our research.
The current study employed a two-step measurements: 1) a forced binary scale to
identify the direction (fair or unfair) and 2) an ordinal scale to capture the magnitude of
perceived fairness and perceived unfairness separately. But this method may not be able
to capture consumers’ dual attitudes or mixed perceptions about price. We must take into
account the possibility that people may perceive hotel room rate increases as reasonable
while still perceiving any price increases as being unfair. It is therefore necessary to
develop a more robust measurement model to capture full range of perceived fairness and
perceived unfairness.
Finally, while this research found an effect of price increases in hedonic versus
utilitarian situations on perceived price unfairness. The relationship between perceived
price unfairness and behavioral responses needs further investigation. Many researchers
have suggested that hotels’ dynamic pricing may harm the long-term relationship
between customers and hotels. However, the current research only measure short-term
behavioral intentions. More research is needed to find out how consumers’ perceived
unfairness influences long-term customer behaviors.
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CHAPTER 3. STUDY2: THE BIVARIATE NATURE OF PERCEIVED PRICE
UNFAIRNESS

The following article will be submitted to the International Journal of Hospitality
Management and is included here as chapter three in this non-traditional
thesis/dissertation. This article is written in APA style format.

3.1

Abstract

Consumers' perceived price fairness is an important judgment when consumers
evaluate a hotel's offered price and make the decision to book. Perceived fairness and
unfairness have been conceptualized as being reciprocally activated and are often
empirically tested using a binary or bipolar dimension(s) on a continuum scale(s).
However, much of the literature believe there to be a conceptual distinction and
asymmetric relationship between fairness and unfairness, casting doubt on the
appropriateness of applying binary or a bipolar scale(s) to fair and unfair perceptions
measurement. This research aims to show that bivariate measurements of perceived
fairness and unfairness are more accurate than conventional bipolar measurements. The
results present evidence for the independent operation of perceived fairness and
unfairness and the stronger effect of perceived fairness on booking intentions than
perceived unfairness. Results also suggest that consumers can have mixed perceptions of
fairness and unfairness, not necessarily either fair or unfair. Lastly, the results indicate
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fairness perceptions are the more powerful driver for booking intentions rather than
unfair perceptions.
Key words: Perceived fairness, perceived unfairness, functional independence, booking
intentions

3.2

Introduction

Price fairness perception is a human's judgment of whether a price or pricing
process is reasonable, acceptable, or just (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Xia, Monroe, &
Cox, 2004). It requires the activation of evaluative processes to compare a seller's price
against a personal standard, reference, or norm (Xia et al., 2004). The activation of
evaluative processes has traditionally been conceptualized as falling along a bipolar
dimension (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994). Price fairness perception has been
predominately measured by bipolar scales from fair (positive evaluation) to unfair
(negative evaluation) (Bolton et al., 2003; Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal, 2003; Xia et al.,
2004) based on the assumption that negative and positive evaluative processes are
reciprocally activated (Thurstone, 1929). For this reason, researchers have extensively
employed bipolar measurement(s) in measuring human response to external stimulus
(e.g., perception, emotion, attitude, behavior, etc.), including the measurement of
consumers' price fairness perceptions.
However, many researchers insist that perceived fairness and unfairness are
conceptually different due to negative dominance, and that negative evaluation of
unfairness is clearer, sharper, and more concrete than positive evaluation of fairness
(Adams 1963; Taylor & Fiske 1978; Kanouse 1984; Finkel, et al., 2001; Xia, et al., 2004;
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Haws & Bearden 2006). Bipolar measurement is insufficient to represent
comprehensively positive and negative evaluative processes (Cacioppo & Bernston,
1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997). In particular, bipolar measurement methods cannot
sufficiently explain neutrality. Neutrality includes both indifference (a low level of both
positive and negative evaluation) and ambivalent perceptions (both positive and negative
evaluation) in bipolar measurement (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997).
One example of how neutrality may be forced and/or distorted in bipolar
measurements of fairness and unfairness perceptions can be found in the influence of
expectations and norms on consumers’ perceptions. When a consumer plans to book a
hotel to attend an event (e.g., professional football game), s/he may expect the room rate
to be double the average room rate—$200 rather than $100, for instance—due to the
event. If s/he finds a room rate of $160, how will s/he evaluate this price? The increased
room rate of $160 can be considered as gain or as a loss, depending on whether s/he
compares the rate to the average price of $100 or her/his expected price of $200. Prior to
the 1990s, when the hotel industry implemented dynamic pricing, s/he would have
compared the rate of the average price of $100, as the social norm of fairness (which
outlines that any price increases driven by demand increases are considered unfair) was
prevalent during that time period.
In more recent times, however, hotel consumers have become more familiar with
and accepting of dynamic pricing (Kimes & Wirtz 2003; Wirtz & Kimes, 2007).
Consumers conventionally expect hotel room rates to be dynamically driven by demand
and dynamic pricing practices are considered to be normal business practice in the hotel
industry (Farahmand & Chatterjee, 2008). In other words, with the repeated exposure to
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the stimulus of dynamic pricing, the consumers' norm has changed (Kahneman & Miller,
1986). Does the change in norm necessarily mean that consumers' reaction to any price
increase has also automatically changed? According to the norm theory, people may have
both old and new norms; although a new norm has explicitly replaced an old norm, the
old norm may have remained in memory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Wilson, et al.,
2000). To revert back to the example above, s/he may accept price increases to $200 due
to the football game based on business norms in the hotel industry, but at the same time,
s/he may perceive it as unfair based on the social norm of fairness principle. Furthermore,
as negative bias often dominates the human evaluative process (Bazerman, et al., 1995;
Rozin & Royzman, 2001), it is likely that s/he may perceive the price increases as unfair
in a bipolar measurement, thus manifesting the negative option.
The purpose of this study is to examine the bivariate structure of consumers'
perceived fairness and unfairness evaluations and its effect on hotel booking intention.
This research uses a scenario-based survey to manipulate hedonic (i.e., sporting event)
and utilitarian (i.e., severe weather) event experimental situations. The present study
assesses the effect of price increases on perceived fairness and unfairness independently.
This study examines the impact of perceived fairness and unfairness on consumers’
booking intentions and investigates the moderating effect of hedonic versus utilitarian
situations on this relationship.
The empirical test of the bivariate structure of perceived fairness and unfairness
yields important theoretical and managerial implications. Theoretically, this study
contributes to the scholarly work on measurements of perceived fairness and unfairness
by providing empirical evidence that perceived fairness and unfairness are
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distinguishable and functionally independent. Further, this study suggests that bivariate
measurements are superior to bipolar measurements of perceived fairness and unfairness
to sufficiently measure consumers' whole perceptions of price fairness and unfairness.
Finally, the results of this study, counterintuitive to more than a few owner-managers,
suggest that hotel management might consider promoting consumers' perceived price
fairness, rather than reducing perceived unfairness, to attract more consumers to book
their hotel.

3.3
3.3.1

Literature Review

Price Fairness Perceptions Toward Hotels’ Dynamic Pricing

Common social norms dictate that perceived price unfairness restricts firms' profit
maximization (Kahneman et al., 1986; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman, 1992). In
their classic research in 1986, Kahneman and his colleagues proposed the principle of fair
price, referred to as "dual entitlement," and applied this principle to the hospitality
industry with the maxim, "[i]f you gouge them at Christmas, they won't be back in
March" (Kahneman, Knetsch et al. 1986). Indeed, in the hotel industry, the initial
implementation of dynamic pricing on revenue management was considered unfair by
consumers in the 1990s (Kimes 1997). Nevertheless, dynamic pricing has been
successfully implemented for hotel firms' revenue maximization, becoming both
acceptable to consumers (Kimes & Wirtz, 2003) and a business norm for hotel
management (Farahmand & Chatterjee, 2008).
Fairness judgments involved in price fairness perceptions require consumers to
activate an evaluative process in which they compare an offered price with their multiple
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reference points and norms (Kahneman 1992; Martins & Monroe, 1994; Monroe, 2003;
Xia, Monroe et al., 2004). The change in consumers' normative attitude toward hotels'
dynamic pricing and their reference points suggests an evolution in consumers' price
fairness perceptions (Jone & Skarlick, 2012).
Although hotels' dynamic pricing is now considered a business norm, it may not
completely replace the social norm of fairness held by consumers (Kahneman & Miller,
1986, Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Let's recall the example of the football fan
above. S/he expected that the hotel room rate would be doubled and found room rate
increases of 60%. How does s/he judge the price fairness of the price increases? It is
increased by 60%, which is less than an expectation of a 100% increase. S/he will judge
this situation as either fair (compared to an expectation) or unfair (compared to the
average price), or both fair and unfair (mixed perception). The offered price can be
evaluated based on multiple reference points, without completely resolving the conflict
between the gaps among the multiple reference points. As a consequence, the same level
of price increases can be perceived both fair and unfair (Kahneman, 1992). The most
important implication here is that the intermediate value that a consumer could select in a
bipolar measurement is neutral (or as equally fair or unfair), which is not the consumer’s
true perception; such ambivalence is disregarded when we use binary or bipolar
measurement.
Furthermore, binary or bipolar measurement presents the problem of negative
bias. Consumer perceptions of price fairness have been predominantly measured on a
continuum such as fair (extremely (very) unfair – extremely (very) fair), reasonable
(extremely unreasonable – extremely reasonable), and acceptable (extremely
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unacceptable – extremely acceptable) (Bolton et al., 2003, Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal,
2003). However, existing literature suggests that this scheme may result in an inaccurate
representation of consumers’ perceptions (Xia et al., 2004). Several researchers contend
that perceived unfairness is conceptually different from perceived fairness because
perceived unfairness is clearer and sharper; consumers are also better able to articulate
the causal antecedents and consequences of perceived unfairness rather than perceived
fairness (Haws & Bearden, 2006; Xia et al., 2004). Along similar lines of argument,
Adams (1963) points out that the inequity concept is more critical than that of equity.
Unfair situations are described as more salient (Kanouse, 1984) and more distinctly
remembered (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) than fair ones. Unfair situations are more distinct for
consumers because unfair events are phenomenologically associated with a sense of loss
whereas fair events are associated with gains (Lupfer, et al., 2000). Therefore, the
bivariate structure of perceived fairness and perceived unfairness is needed to resolve the
limited capacity of bipolar measurement.

3.3.2

Bivariate Structure of Perceived Fairness and Unfairness

To understand the conceptual structure of perceived fairness and unfairness
(positive and negative evaluation), it is necessary to look at the structure of evaluative
space. The bivariate structure of positive and negative evaluative processes has been
extensively studied in the field of psychology (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; Cacioppo et
al., 1997; Norris, Gollan, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2010). Both mixed emotions (Williams
& Aaker, 2002) and dual attitudes (Wilson et al., 2000), suggest that the bivariate space
of negativity and positivity represent human's evaluative process more comprehensively
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than a bipolar continuum (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997). Although
positive and negative evaluative processes have traditionally been conceptualized as
being reciprocally activated, allowing the bipolar scale appropriate measurement of
positive and negative judgment (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994), positive and negative
processes are not necessarily reciprocally activated but "can be activated reciprocally
(e.g., mutually exclusive and incompatible), uncoupled (e.g., singularly activated), or
non-reciprocally (e.g., co-activation or co-inhibitory; the principle of bivalent modes of
evaluative activation)" (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994, p. 402). In other words, positive and
negative evaluative processes are distinguishable (functionally independent) and
characterized by distinct activation functions.
The bivariate evaluative plan illustrated in Figure 3.1 demonstrates all
combinations of positive and negative evaluative activation: a) the reciprocally activated
high level of negativity and low level of positivity (implying perceived unfairness), b) the
reciprocally activated high level of positivity and low level of negativity (implying
perceived fairness), c) the non-reciprocally activated high level of positivity and high
level of negativity (implying an ambivalent mode of perceived fairness and unfairness
which reflects maximal conflict), and d) the non-reciprocally activated low level of both
positivity and negativity (implying indifference). In the bipolar dimension, a) the nonreciprocally activated high level of positivity and negativity (ambivalent perceptions) and
b) the non-reciprocally activated low level of positivity and negativity could be merged to
a neutral point in the bipolar framework. Further, the combinations of non-mutually
exclusive activations could not be measured by bipolar dimension(s).
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Figure 3.1 The Bivariate Evaluative Plane.
The left axis represents the level of excitatory activation of positive evaluative processes (labeled
positivity) and the right axis represents the level of excitatory activation of negative evaluative
processes (labeled negativity). Along each axis, the level of activity increases with movement
away from the front axis intersection. The dotted diagonal extending from the left to the right axis
intersections represents the diagonal of reciprocal control (labeled reciprocity). The dashed
diagonal extending from the back to the front axis intersections depicts the diagonal of
nonreciprocal control (labeled coactivity) and the arrows alongside the axes represent uncoupled
changes in positive or in negative evaluative processing. These diagonals and axes and vectors
parallel to them illustrate the major modes of evaluative activation.
Note. From "Relationship between attitudes and evaluative space: A critical review, with
emphasis on the separability of positive and negative substrates." By J.T. Cacioppo and G.G.
Berntson, 1994, Psychological Bulletin, 115, p. 402. Copyright © 1994 by the American
Psychological Association.

If the positive and negative evaluative processes are not mutually exclusive but
separable, a functional independence can be established (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994).
As discussed in the example for the ambivalent perceptions of fairness and unfairness due
to hotels’ transition toward dynamic pricing, we assume the superiority of bivariate
measurement of positive and negative evaluative process, based on the conceptual
foundations provided above, to hypothesize:
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H1. Perceived fairness and perceived unfairness are independent measurements.

As mentioned above, bipolar measurement may contain inherent negativity
dominance (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman,
2001). When positive and negative perceptions are co-activated, the stronger perceptions
will dominate and be observed (Cacioppo et al., 1997). That is, when those who have
ambivalent perceptions are asked to indicate their degree of positive and negative
perceptions in a bipolar continuum, they may tend to choose a negative point (Cacioppo
et al., 1997). In the bivariate measurement of perceived fairness and unfairness, this
negativity bias will give weight to perceived unfairness. As a negative evaluative
activation is steeper than the positive evaluative activation, the output in negative
evaluative activation is larger than the output in positive evaluative activation. Therefore,
we hypothesize:

H2. The effect of price increases is stronger on perceived unfairness than on
perceived fairness. |β PI  PUF| > | β PI PF|

H3. The effect of perceived unfairness on booking intentions is stronger than the
effect of perceived fairness on booking intentions. |β PUF  BI| > | β PF  BI|

3.3.3

Hedonic vs. Utilitarian Situation

External events such as sporting events, mega events, cultural events, and
disaster-related events (e.g., severe weather, airplane crashes, etc.) frame consumer
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motivations to book a hotel room. For example, when a sports fan plans to travel and
book a hotel stay with intentions to enjoy a game (hedonic situation), s/he is acting upon
a hedonic motivation. However, during a severe weather related event, consumers may
have a utilitarian motivation in seeking a hotel room as a form of alternative housing.
And such situational contexts impact consumers’ responses to price increases (Monroe,
2003; 2012). Wakefield and Inman (2003) found that consumers with hedonic
motivations tended to have less sensitivity to price and might pay extra for a product or
service (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982). On the other hand, consumers with utilitarian
motivations were more sensitive to price (Wakefield & Inman, 2003) and were thinking
more rationally when they made purchasing decisions (i.e. hotel booking). Similarly,
consumers may have a different level of perceived price value for a hotel stay. In the
same vein, it is likely that the relationship between perceived price fairness/unfairness
and booking intentions could be moderated by a hedonic or a utilitarian situation.

H4. Hedonic vs. Utilitarian situations significantly moderate perceived fairness,
perceived unfairness, and booking intentions.
H4a: The impact of price increases on perceived fairness differs depending on the
hedonic vs. utilitarian situation. (β Hedonic: PIPF ≠ β Utilitarian: PI PF)
H4b: The impact of price increases on perceived unfairness differs depending on
the hedonic vs. utilitarian situation. (β Hedonic: PI  BI ≠ β Utilitarian PI  BI)
H4c: The impact of perceived fairness on booking intentions differs depending on
the hedonic vs. utilitarian situation. ( β Hedonic: PF  BI ≠ β Utilitarian: PF  BI)
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H4d: The impact of perceived unfairness on booking intentions differs depending
on hedonic vs. utilitarian situation. (βHedonic: PUF  BI ≠ βUtilitarian PUF  BI)

3.4

Methodology

3.4.1

Measurements

A scenario experiment was used to manipulate experimental situations. The
questionnaire consisted of four sections. The first section assessed the participant's hotel
booking experiences (i.e. frequency of hotel booking experience within the past year,
internet booking experience, familiarity with hotel's dynamic pricing, etc.) to facilitate
the respondents’ recall of their hotel booking experiences. In the second section, the
respondents were randomly assigned to one of two situational scenarios: planning to book
a hotel for a sporting event vs. planning to book a hotel due to a severe weather-related
event (Table 3.1).
After reading the randomly assigned scenario, participants were asked to indicate
the level of perceived hedonic and utilitarian value of a hotel stay in the given situation.
These questions used hedonic and utilitarian measurement items (Voss, Spangenberg, &
Grohmann, 2003) to confirm if the given scenarios successfully represented a hedonic
versus a utilitarian situation.

59
Table 3.1 Scenario Description
Scenario 1: Sporting event (Hedonic situation)
 Imagine that you were planning a trip to watch your favorite professional sports
teams play. You were planning to stay in a hotel for the game night. You found
a 3-star hotel that satisfied your needs.
 Typically, you know that the average room rate for this type of hotel is $100.
 Due to the football game, all hotels were expected to be fully booked on the
game night.
Scenario 2: Weather related event (Utilitarian situation)
 Imagine that your neighborhood area was flooded and had a power outage due
to a storm. You are planning to stay in a hotel for the night as an alternative
housing. You found a 3-star hotel that satisfied your needs.
 Typically, you know the average room rate for this type of hotel is $100.
 Due to the storm, all hotels were expected to be fully booked for the night of
your stay.

Once participants presented their level of perceived hedonic vs. utilitarian value in
the given situation, they were asked to indicate their internal reference price. Based on
the “range theory,” each participant was asked to provide his/her reference prices: 1) for
fair price, “what hotel room price would you consider fair in this given situation?” and 2)
for WTP (willing to pay), "what is the highest rate you would be willing to pay under the
described circumstance?" Then, each participant was randomly assigned one of the
sequential scenarios regarding the magnitude of room rate increases
($20/$40/$60/$80/$100) and was asked to indicate their level of fairness perceptions in
the given situation, each with four measurement items: reasonable, acceptable, fair, and
justifiable. (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003).
After measuring their level of fairness perceptions, the subjects were asked to
recall the given scenario situation and to indicate the correct situation to ensure the
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subject correctly envisioned themselves in the manipulated situation. This validation
question was employed to minimize the carry-over effect of prior perceptions fairness
questions remaining in their memory and reduce the common method bias (Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). After the validation question, the subjects were asked
to indicate their perceptions level of unfairness with four measurement items:
unreasonable, unacceptable, unfair and unjustifiable. We avoided using bipolar
continuum scales and instead used two different measurement constructs: fairness
perceptions and unfairness perceptions using a 7-Likert scale (Strongly Disagree –
Strongly Agree).
The final section assessed the participant's demographic variables (i.e. gender,
age, education, marital status, annual household income, and employment). At the end of
the survey, we added a question to verify whether each respondent fully understood the
given situation. If a respondent chose the wrong answer, we assumed that the respondent
was not qualified to participate in the project, and their answers were eliminated.

3.5
3.5.1

Results

Respondents’ Profiles

A total of 761 surveys were collected from Internet survey panels. Of the
respondents, 729 reported that they had experienced and were familiar with hotel's
dynamic pricing practice. We chose only these respondents for the data analysis. Among
those respondents, outliers were retained as outliers reflect the random variability
inherent in a randomized assignment.
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Table 3.2 Respondents’ Demographics (N=729)
Characteristics

Freq.

Percent

Gender

Characteristics

Freq.

Percent

Marital Status

Male

399 54.81%

Married

289

39.64%

Female

329 45.19%

Single

398

54.60%

Other

42

5.76%

Age

Total annual household income

18-20

8

1.1%

Less than $20,000

165

22.63%

21-30

305 42.84%

$20,001 - $40,000

222

30.45%

31-40

239 32.78%

$40,001 – $60,000

170

23.32%

41-50

88 12.07%

$60,001 – $80,000

86

11.80%

51-60

62

8.50%

More than $80,001

86

11.80%

61-

27

3.70%

Education

Employment

High School or equivalent

176 24.14%

Part-time employed

171

23.49%

2-year college degree

166 22.77%

Full-time employed

431

59.20%

4-year college degree

294 40.33%

Unemployed

61

8.38%

Retired

22

3.02%

Homemaker

31

4.26%

Others

12

1.62%

Graduate / Professional degree

Note: Insignificant level of χ

2

93 12.86%

indicates the homogeneity of sample distribution in each group

Table 3.2 shows the respondents’ demographics and profiles. Among the 729
valid respondents, 54.81% are male, and 45.19% are female. The average age of
respondents is 35.13 years old with the ages ranging from 18 to 73. The average annual
household income levels indicate that 76.41% of respondents have an annual household
income of $60,000 or less, and 23.59% have an annual income over $60,000. The sample
includes 43.82 % of respondents who have a high school or associate's degree and
56.18% with a bachelor’s degree or higher. 3.98% of respondents have not stayed at a
hotel in the past 12 months, 75.17% of respondents have stayed at a hotel 1 to 4 times in
the past 12 months, and 20.85% of respondents have stayed at a hotel more than five
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times in the past 12 months. 1.51% of respondents usually stay in one-star hotels, 6.88%
of respondents tend to stay in two-star hotels, 56.81% in three-star hotels, and 34.60 % of
them primarily stay in four or five-star hotels. Most respondents (99.45%) have used the
Internet to book a hotel.

3.5.2

Manipulation Check: Hedonic vs. Utilitarian Situation

We compared the mean values of participants’ perceptions of the level of hedonic
vs. utilitarian value between groups for the sporting event and the weather related event.
Because the hedonic group exhibits a significantly higher perceived level of hedonic
value (μ hedonic = 4.609, μ utilitarian = 3.156 Δμ = 1.453, t= 14.226 (df = 727), p<0.001) and
the utilitarian group a significantly higher perceived level of utilitarian value (μ utilitarian =
5.736, μ hedonic = 5.221, Δμ = 0.515, t= 6.321 (df = 727), p<0.001), we concluded that our
treatments had the intended effect.

3.5.3

Bivariate Measurement of Price Fairness Perceptions

According to the principle of bivariate modes of evaluative activation, positively
and negatively evaluative functions are not necessarily reciprocally activated but can be
activated either reciprocally (e.g., mutually exclusive and incompatible) or nonreciprocally (e.g., co-activated or indifferent) (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). The scatter
plot of perceived fairness and unfairness depicted in Figure 3.2 provides an interesting
alternative perspective on the distribution of perceived fairness and unfairness. If
perceived fairness and unfairness are reciprocally activated and measured by bipolar
scales, only reciprocal outcomes (fair-neutral-unfair) are considered as meaningful, and
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subjects who did not fall in the line of reciprocity should be considered as "statistical
errors." Accordingly, we do not disregard these as “statistical errors” in the bivariate
distribution.

Figure 3.2 Bivariate Structure of Price Fairness Perceptions

As Figure 3.2 demonstrates, subjects evaluate the given situation as 1) fair and
less unfair (top left area), 2) fair and unfair (right top), 3) less fair – less unfair (left
bottom), and 4) unfair and less fair (right bottom). These four modes of the evaluative
process for price fairness can be categorized as 1) fair group, 2) ambivalent mode of fair
and unfair, 3) indifferent group, and 4) unfair group, respectively. As the bivariate
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evaluative plane (Figure 3.1) suggests, the scatter plot of perceived fairness and
unfairness (Figure 3.3) demonstrates that when consumers evaluate a hotel room's price,
they can have 1) reciprocally activated fair and less unfair perceptions, 2) nonreciprocally co-activated both fair and unfair perceptions, 3) low level of both fair and
unfair perceptions, and 4) reciprocally activated unfair and less fair perceptions of the
same stimulus. This is evidence that bivariate measurement of perceived fairness and
unfairness is superior to bipolar measurement, which does not capture co-activated
(mixed) perceptions of fairness and unfairness. Furthermore, it shows that neutrality in
bipolar scales indeed represents co-activated perceptions (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994).

Table 3.3 Distribution of Consumers’ Price Perceptions
N= 729
Freq. (%)
Fair

+$20
62

Hedonic situation
+$40 +$60 +$80 +$100
47
30
11
11

+$20
44

Utilitarian situation
+$40 +$60 +$80
20
18
13

(80.5%)

(63.5%)

(57.9%)

(27.8%)

(38.5%)

(16.2%)

(16.88%)

(25.0%)

(17.8%)

+$100
5
(7.1%)

(Co-activated)

7

5

6

13

7

8

9

9

4

5

Ambivalent

(9.1%)

(6.5%)

7.8%)

(16.9%)

(9.1%)

(10.5%)

(12.5%)

(12.5%)

(5.5%)

(7.1%)

(Co-activated)

6

7

11

9

7

10

15

9

11

9

Indifference

(7.8%)

(9.1%)

(14.3%)

(11.7%)

(9.1%)

(13.2%)

(20.8%)

(12.5%)

(15.1%)

(12.9%)

Unfair

2

15

31

35

44

14

28

36

45

51

(2.6%)

(20.3%)

(39.7%)

(51.5%)

(63.8%)

(18.4%)

(38.9%)

(50.0%)

(61.6%)

(72.9%)

Total
77
74
78
68
69
76
72
72
73
2
2
Note: Kruskal-Wallis Test: Hedonic group: 𝜒 (df=4) = 90.50; p < 0.001, Utilitarian group: 𝜒 (df=4) = 55.74;
p < 0.001
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Distribution of consumers' price perception
100.0%
80.0%
60.0%
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Utilitarian

$60

$80

$100

Hedonic
Unfair

Co-activated

Fair

Figure 3.3 Structure of Perceived Unfairness/Fairness in Each Group

3.5.4

Measurement Model

3.5.4.1 Overall Measurement Model
Based on Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step approach, a measurement
model using Stata ® 13 was estimated before the structural model. A confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) was first conducted to assess the measurement model and to test
reliability, construct validity, and convergent validity. All standardized factor loadings of
each construct are high, ranging between 0.892 and 0.972, which ensures the
measurement has convergent validity. All Cronbach’s alpha values as well as composite
reliability values are above 0.9, ensuring internal consistency.
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Table 3.4 Standardized Confirmatory Factor Analysis Properties and Reliability
Factors

Factor
Loading

Perceived Price Fairness
Reasonable

.960

Acceptable

.965

Fair

.922

Justifiable

.878

Perceived Price Unfairness
Unreasonable

.964

Unacceptable

.972

Unfair

.917

Unjustifiable

.887

Booking Intentions
Willing to book

.906

Would like to book

.951

Will book a room

.964

Cronbach α

Composite Reliability
.967

.974

.968

.947

.957

.958

As shown in Table 3.5, the average variance extracted (AVE) values from two
constructs exceed the cut-off criterion of 0.5, and are greater than the squared correlations
of perceived price unfairness and perceived price fairness. This proves the measurement
has convergent validity and discriminant validity. The CFA on three latent variables
(perceived fairness, perceived unfairness, and booking intentions) with eleven observed
variables shows the goodness-of-fit indices (χ2 =219.96, df=38, p< 0.01), root mean
square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .080, comparative fit index [CFI] = .985, and
Tucker-Lewis Index [TLI] = .978. Since these measurement model fit indices suggest a
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good model fit, we can conclude that perceived price fairness and perceived price
unfairness are independent measurement constructs. Therefore, H1 is supported.

Table 3.5 Measured Correlations, Squared Correlations, and Average Variance Extracted
(AVE)
PPF
Perceived Price Fairness
Perceived Price Unfairness

PPUF

BI

1.00
-.842**
1.00

(squared correlations)
Booking Intentions

(.598)
.764**

-.706

(.583)

(.498)

AVE

.881

.857

.885

Mean

3.795

4.190

4.074

SD

1.756

1.844

1.794

1.00
(squared correlations)

Note: ** p< 0.01 * p<0.01
Model Measurement Fit: χ2 =219.96, df =38 (p< 0.01), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
[RMSEA] = .080, Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .985, Tucker-Lewis Index [TLI] = .978
AVE = Sum of squared standardized loading / (Sum of squared standardized loading + sum of indicator
measurement error)
Composite reliability = Squared sum of loading / (squared sum of loading + sum of indicator)

3.5.4.2 Test for invariance comparing hedonic and utilitarian situations
A measurement invariance test was conducted to verify invariance across hedonic
and utilitarian situations (Acock, 2013). A non-constraint model for hedonic and
utilitarian situations was assessed and compared to the full-metric invariance model for
the two situations. The results of the measurement invariance test are summarized in
Table 3.6. The results demonstrate that the chi-square difference of likelihood-ratio test
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between the constraint invariance model and the full-metric invariance model is
insignificant, ensuring that our proposed model is valid for both hedonic and utilitarian
situations.

Table 3.6 Test for Metric Invariance Comparing for Hedonic and Utilitarian Situations
Model
Constraint
model
Full metric
model

χ2(df)

RMSEA

CFI

TLI

Δ2

303.14(76)

0.091

0.981

0.973

12.23(8)

315.38(84)

0.087

0.981

0.975

P >0.05 (NS)

3.5.4.3 Measurement Model Comparison
The additional model comparison was conducted to ensure that our proposed
bivariate measurement model is better than other single “fairness perception” or
“unfairness perception” models. The results show that the chi-square differences between
the proposed model and the fairness only model (Δ2=116.27(26) p<0.001) and between
the proposed model and the unfairness only model (Δ2=136.48(26) p<0.001) are
significant, confirming that our proposed model is better than "fairness perception" only
and "unfairness perception" only models.
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Table 3.7 Measurement Model Comparison
Bivariate (proposed)

Fairness only

Unfairness only

219.96 (38)

103.69 (12)

83.48(12)

p < 0.0001

p <0.0001

p<0.0001

RMSEA

0.08

0.102

0.090

CFI

0.985

0.987

0.990

TLI

0.978

0.977

0.982

R2

0.999

0.995

0.996

Chi-Square (df)

Note:
Δ2 (between the proposed model and fairness only model) = 116.27(26) p<0.0001
Δ2 (between the proposed model and unfairness only model) = 136.48(26) p<0.0001

3.5.5 Structural Equation Model
A structural equation model using Stata® 13 estimated the relations among price
increases, perceived fairness, perceived unfairness, and booking intentions (Figure 3.4).
The global fit indices indicate a goodness-of-fit statistic (χ2 =251.67, df=46, p< 0.0001,
RMSEA= 0.078, CFI =0.984, TLI = 0.976) with independent measurements of perceived
unfairness and perceived fairness.
In the line with H2, the Steiger’s Z- test was used to test the significance of the
differences in coefficients of price increases on perceived fairness and perceived
unfairness, as suggested by Meng, Rosenthal et al. (1992). Price increases were expected
to be powerfully associated with perceived unfairness (β = .512) than with perceived
fairness (β = -.507) but the Steiger’s Z = 0.14 (p>0.05) shows the difference is
insignificant. Thus, H2 is not supported.

Regarding the test for H3, the results were
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opposite of our hypothesis. The effect of perceived fairness on booking intentions (β
PFBI =

.602) is stronger than the effect of unfairness on booking intentions (β PUFBI =

-.143) (z = 10.52, p<0.001). Thus, H3 is not supported.

Figure 3.4 Structural Model
*** p <0.001
Goodness-of-fit statistics: χ2 =251.67 (df=46, p< 0.001), RMSEA= 0.078, CFI =0.984,
TLI = 0.976)

The group comparison model fit indices indicate a good model fit (χ2 =405.33,
df=111, p< 0.001, RMSEA= 0.085, CFI =0.976, TLI = 0.972) and the group model is
significantly different from overall model (Δ χ2 = 153.66(65), p<0.001), showing that the
hedonic and utilitarian situations have an interaction effect on the relationship among
price increases, perceived fairness, perceived unfairness and booking intentions.
However, the effect of price increase on both perceived price fairness (χ2(1) = 0.576,
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p>0.05) and perceived price unfairness (χ2(1) = 0.238, p>0.05) was not significantly
moderated by the situation. Thus, H4a and H4b are not supported.
The hedonic and utilitarian situations show marginally different levels in the
relationship between perceived fairness and booking intentions (βHedonic:PFBI = .560,
p<0.001; βUedonic:PFBI = .624, p<0.001; Δβ = .064, χ2(1) = 3.753, p=0.052). The situation
significantly moderates the relationship between perceived unfairness and booking
intentions (βHedonic:PUF BI= .229 p<0.001; βUtilitarian:PUFBI= .113 p<0.001; Δβ = .064, χ2(1)
= 5.486, p<0.05), implying that the hedonic and utilitarian situations moderate the
relationship between perceived fairness and booking intentions and the relationship
between perceived unfairness and booking intentions. Thus, H4c and H4d are supported.
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Table 3.8 Results of SEM and Group Comparison
Overall

Group comparison model

Difference

χ2 (df)

251.673 (46)
p < 0.001

405.34 (111)
p <0.001

153.667 (65)
p <0.0001

RMSEA

0.078

0.085

CFI

0.984

0.976

TFI

0.976

0.972
Hedonic

Utilitarian

Group invariance: χ2 (df)

-.507***

-.517***

-.516***

0.576(1), NS

.512***

.505***

.541***

0.238(1), NS

PI  BI

-.180***

-.156***

-.172***

0.701(1), NS

Unfair  BI 3)

-.143***

-.228***

-.113***

5.486(1), p<0.05

Fair  BI 4)

.602***

.560***

.624***

3.753(1), p=0.052

R2 (Unfairness)

.262

.267

.267

R2 (Fairness)

.257

.255

.293

.738

.682

PI  Fair 1)
PI  Unfair 2)

R2 (BI)

Note.
1)
2)
3)
4)

.699

***

p<0.001

**

*

+

p<0.01, p<0.05, p<0.1, NS: insignificant

H4a is not supported
H4b is not supported
H4c is supported
H4d is supported
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Figure 3.5 The Results of SEM
***p<0.001, **p<0.01
Note: a) Price increases are manipulated variables ($20/$40/$60/$80/$100) and coded as
ordinal.
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Table 3.9 Hypothesis Results
Hypothesis
H1 Perceived fairness and perceived unfairness are independent
measurements.
H2

Results
Supported

The effect of price increases is stronger on perceived
unfairness than on perceived fairness.
Not supported
|β PI  PUF| > | β PI PF|

H3 The effect of perceived unfairness on booking intentions is
stronger than the effect of perceived fairness on booking
Not supported
intentions.
|β PUF  BI| > | β PF  BI|
H4 Hedonic vs. Utilitarian situations significantly moderate
perceived fairness, perceived unfairness, and booking
intentions.
H4a

H4a

H4c

Supported

The impact of price increases on perceived fairness differs
depending on the hedonic vs. utilitarian situation.
Not supported
β Hedonic: PIPF ≠ β Utilitarian: PI PF
The impact of price increases on perceived unfairness
differs depending on the hedonic vs. utilitarian situation.
Not supported
β Hedonic: PI  BI ≠ β Utilitarian PI  BI
The impact of perceived fairness on booking intention
differs depending on the hedonic vs. utilitarian situations.
β Hedonic: PF  BI ≠ β Utilitarian: PF  BI

Supported

H4d The impact of perceived unfairness on booking intentions
differs depending on hedonic vs. utilitarian situation.
βHedonic: PUF  BI ≠ βUtilitarian PUF  BI

Supported
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3.6

Conclusions

3.6.1

Discussion

This study empirically examined the bivariate structure of consumers’ perceived
fairness and unfairness and its effect on hotel booking intentions. A scenario survey was
used to manipulate experimental situations of hotel room rate increases during excess
demand events such as sporting events (hedonic situation) and severe weather-related
events (utilitarian situation).
The CFA results confirm the functional independence of perceived price fairness
and unfairness (H1). The test for metric invariances ensures that the bivariate model is
valid for both hedonic and utilitarian situations. The SEM results indicate that the effect
of price increases on (-) perceived price fairness and (+) unfairness is not different (H2).
This result rejects the common notion that perceived unfairness is clearer and steeper
than perceived fairness. The results show that price increases reciprocally affect both
perceived fairness and unfairness. Interestingly, the results reveal that perceived fairness
has a stronger effect on booking intentions than perceived unfairness, thus rejecting our
hypothesis (H3) that perceived unfairness will have stronger effect on booking intentions.
The rejection of this hypothesis disrupts the long-held notion that “losses loom larger
than gains” and questions the weight given to negative evaluative judgment as the
stronger predictor of behavioral responses insisted on in many existing investigations
(Xia et al., 2004). Due to negative dominance, perceived unfairness is generally
considered to be the stronger response to price increases; however, our results contradict
that logic.
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The results of this study open doors to provocative interpretations. First, it
suggests that the bivariate structure of perceived fairness and unfairness can reduce an
apriori assumed negative dominance. Negative dominance is defined as "the combination
of negative and positive entities yield evaluations that are more negative than the
algebraic sum of the subject of individual subjective valences would predict (Rozin &
Royzman, 2001, p. 296)." In a bipolar dimension, people lean toward the negatively
dominant point to be more likely to choose the "unfair" rather than "fair" option if they
have ambivalent perceptions. The bivariate measurement of fairness and unfairness
captures the subjects' positive and negative entities independently, which can reduce
negative dominance in measuring both fairness and unfairness perceptions. In other
words, the bivariate measurement captures the non-biased and combination of negative
and positive perceptions.
This result is supported by the positivity offset illustrated by Cacioppo et al.
(1997) as "the motivation to approach is stronger than the motivation to avoid ( p. 12)."
Accordingly, perceived fairness (positive evaluation) has a stronger effect on booking
intentions (positive behavior). The positivity offset reveals a difference in the transfer
functions for positivity and negativity that would not be captured if positivity and
negativity were measured by a single bipolar continuum (Cacioppo et al., 1997).
Second, the test for metric invariances for group comparison reveals that hedonic
and utilitarian situations moderate the impact of price increases on perceived fairness and
perceived unfairness as well as the impact of perceived unfairness on booking intentions.
Surprisingly, it was also found here that perceived unfairness does not impact booking
intentions in the utilitarian situation. As described above, perceived fairness rather than
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perceived unfairness has stronger impacts on booking intentions in both situations, even
more so in the utilitarian situation where perceived unfairness had no significant effect on
booking intentions. It should be noted that this result does not mean that perceived
unfairness is not an important factor for consumers in booking a hotel room in utilitarian
situations. In fact, there might be consumers who perceive hotel room rates as unfair but
nevertheless book a room during excess demand events, such as severe weather.

3.6.2

Implications

The empirical test of the bivariate structure of perceived fairness and unfairness
yields important theoretical and managerial implications. Theoretically, this study
contributes to the scholarly work on the measurement of perceived fairness and
unfairness by providing empirical evidence that perceived fairness and unfairness are
distinguishable and functionally independent. Further, this study suggests that a bivariate
measurement is as, appropriate, likely more, than any bipolar measurement of perceived
fairness and unfairness. Consumers may possess ambivalent perceptions of price fairness
and unfairness. A bivariate measure aids in understanding the full range of consumers’
perceived fairness and unfairness. Furthermore, a bivariate measurement of perception
allows researchers to find the effect of fairness and unfairness on consumers’ behavioral
responses separately.
The study also has major implications for managerial practice. First, the results
show that hotel managers should consider perceived fairness and perceived unfairness
separately, and be aware of the fact that consumers may have both fair and unfair
judgments regarding hotel pricing. Accordingly, many consumers have fair and unfair
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and less fair and less unfair perceptions at the same time when searching for a hotel.
Hotel room rate increases are negatively associated with consumers’ perceived fairness
and positively with unfairness. However, this study’s findings suggest that consumers'
perceived fairness is the more powerful driver in booking a hotel. Therefore, hotel
management might consider promoting consumers' perceived price fairness rather than
reducing perceived unfairness to attract more consumers to book.
Second, the current study identifies a not-significant relationship between
perceived unfairness and booking intentions in the utilitarian situation. The result points
out the unpredictable consequences of perceived unfairness. For hotel operators and
managers, it would be easier to set room rates and operate the hotel business when they
can predict demand. Hotel managers should keep in mind that although consumers may
be willing to book a hotel room in spite of their unfairness perceptions, they might be
unpleasant and unhappy when they visit the hotel. Hence in situations where consumers
feel as if they have no choice but to book a hotel, the utilitarian situation, operators might
be wise to consider this and make their stay as effortless and comfortable as possible.
Third, the non-significant relationship between perceived unfairness and booking
intentions could be interpreted as allowing hotel operators to ignore consumers’
unfairness perceptions during a utilitarian situation. According to Maxwell (2002), the
relative power of the buyer and seller influences fair/unfair relationships. If consumers
have alternative options, room rate increases might not tend to be perceived as
unfavorably, or unfair. In these types of circumstances hotels might consider cooperating
with local governmental and other public organizations and associations to accommodate
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consumers’ needs for alternative housing. Public shelters or Airbnb could easily expand a
limited supply of hotel rooms during high demand in utilitarian situations.

3.6.3

Limitations

Several limitations of this study should be considered when interpreting the
results for future studies. First, although this study pioneers an examination of the
bivariate measurement for perceived fairness and unfairness in place of the traditional
measurement using bipolar scales, terminology used in traditional measurement such as
fair, reasonable, acceptable, justifiable for perceived fairness and unfair, unreasonable,
unacceptable, unacceptable, and unjustifiable for perceived unfairness were used.
Cacioppo et al. (1997) points out the need to minimize the possibility that participants
may treat these unipolar scales as bipolar scales when using antonym pairs. To minimize
the carry-over effect in the survey conducted for this study, participants were asked to
recall the scenario situation before they were asked to indicate the magnitude of their
unfairness perceptions. Nevertheless, the scales of perceived fairness and perceived
unfairness were used in antonym pairs. This may have opened the possibility that
participants treated these bivariate scales as bipolar scales. Therefore, future research
should consider choosing the wording more carefully to clearly treat the study as onedimensional bivariate scales rather than bipolar.
Second, this study manipulated experimental situations, a 3-star hotel visit to
attend a sporting event and an equivalent hotel stay mandated by severe weather.
Therefore, these results may be limited in their application to other hotel settings. Third,
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this research did not include negative behavioral intentions such as negative word of
mouth, complaint, cancellation of the plan, etc.
Lastly, individual characteristics and different levels of involvement in the
experimental situations were not considered. Participants who were asked to consider a
hotel stay because of a sports game but are not actually big fans of sports may have a
lower given level of involvement while a sporting fan might have a stronger involvement.
It is possible that different levels of involvement will have significant impact on
perceived price fairness / unfairness and booking intentions. Future studies may extend
these research findings by integrating personal variables (demographic and
psychographics) and involvement factors that may reveal a different relationship between
the research constructs.
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CHAPTER 4. STUDY3: THE MODERATING ROLE OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE
RELATIONSHIP AMONG PRICE INCREASES, PERCEIVED UNFAIRNESS,
AND BOOKING INTENTIONS

The following article will be submitted to the International Journal of Hospitality
Management and is included here as chapter three in this non-traditional
thesis/dissertation. This article is written in APA style format.

4.1

Abstract

This research examines the moderating role of consumer involvement in the
relationship among price increases, perceived price fairness and unfairness, and hotel
booking intentions. The results revealed that low-involvement consumers are more
sensitive to price increases but their price unfairness perceptions do not have significant
effect on their booking intentions. Contrastingly, high-involvement consumers are less
sensitive to price increases, but their price evaluation has more influence on their booking
intentions. The findings practically imply that low-involvement consumers are easily
affected by simple information on room rates, but their booking intentions are not
predictable as high-involvement consumers’ booking intentions. For both high- and lowinvolvement consumers, consumers’ perceived price fairness is the stronger driver of
booking intentions than perceived price unfairness. Therefore, hotel operators and

82
managers might consider promoting consumers' perceived price fairness rather than
reducing perceived unfairness to attract more consumers to book.
Keywords: Involvement, perceived price fairness, perceived price unfairness, booking
intentions

4.2

Introduction

Hotel revenue management (hereafter RM) refers to the strategy of allocating the
right type of capacity to the right kind of customer at the right price so as to maximize
revenue (Kimes, 1989a, p. 15; 1989b). When the hotel industry initially adopted RM in
the late 1980s, the nature of its demand-driven pricing was seen as a violation of the
fairness principle, and consumers' price unfairness perceptions presented a critical
restriction in applying RM pricing (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Kimes, 1989a).
As a result, much of the literature on RM has been devoted to identifying moderating
factors that influence consumers’ price unfairness perceptions toward RM pricing
practices; these include familiarity (Andres-Martinez, Gomez-Borja, &
Modejar_Jimenez, 2014; Mauri, 2007; Wirtz & Kimes, 2007), consumer characteristics
(Beldona & Kwansa, 2008; Srikanth Beldona & Namasivayam, 2006; Heo & Lee, 2011),
existing information (Choi & Mattila, 2005; Taylor & Kimes, 2011), pricing framing
(Choi & Mattila, 2009; Noone & Mattila, 2009), and norm perceptions (Choi & Mattila,
2009), etc.
For example, consumers’ familiarity has been extensively examined as a factor that
moderates and influences the way consumers perceive the fairness of RM’s dynamic
pricing (Wirtz & Kimes, 2007; Mauri, 2007; Choi & Matilla, 2003; Heo & Lee, 2010).
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Previous studies have found that the more familiar consumers are with dynamic pricings,
the more likely they are to perceive it as acceptable. As consumers’ price fairness
perceptions are subjective (Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004) and sensitive to contextual factors
(Kalapurakal, Peter, & Urbany, 1991), many researchers have contested the
generalizability of the “dual entitlement” fairness principle (Kalapurakal, et al., 1991;
Urbany, Madden, & Dickson, 1989). The dual entitlement fairness principle proposes an
implicit contract between sellers and buyers; increasing prices in response to demand is
considered to violate this contract and thus be unfair (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler,
1986). It has been argued that when consumers have a high degree of self-interest and
involvement in the transaction, there may be no simple, robust principles that govern the
standard of what is fair or unfair pricing (Kalapurakal, et al., 1991; Urbany et al., 1989;
Xia, et al., 2004).
Involvement theory explains this phenomenon by stating that consumers have
different standards for evaluating the seller's price depending on how involved they are in
the situation (Chandrashekaran, 2012; Chandrashekaran & Grewal, 2003). More
specifically in terms of hotel room rates, involvement theory implies that consumers who
have different degrees of involvement use different processes in evaluating the same
situation of hotel room rate increases because they may have different levels of
knowledge, information, and desire (Bloch & Richins, 1983). When high-involvement
consumers evaluate the offered price, they may immediately recall their knowledge,
experiences, and well-developed standards to evaluate the offered price (Biswas & Blair,
1991; Biswas & Sherrell, 1993; Chandrashekaran, 2012). When low-involvement
consumers evaluate the offered price, they may consider the price information itself to be
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more important than any other criteria because they do not have much knowledge and
information about the product or service in the market to evaluate the seller’s prices
(Biswas & Sherrell, 1993). However, although the level of involvement has been
examined in the context of decision-making processes (Park, Lee, & Han, 2007; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1979) and behavioral pricing (Chandrashekaran, 2012), it has not yet been
applied to price fairness perceptions research in the hotel industry. To address this gap in
research, this study examines high/low involvement as a moderator to determine its
influence on the research model.
Another limitation of the research on the relationship between consumers’ price
fairness perceptions and behavioral response in the hotel industry is caused by using a
bipolar measurement of price fairness perceptions. Previous research has used the bipolar
conceptualization to measure consumers’ perceived price fairness. It is intuitively
apparent that the bipolarity of positive and negative evaluative processes leads to a
positive or negative behavioral response, respectively (i.e., approach and avoidance
behavior) (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994). Indeed, the relationship between perceived price
fairness and behavioral intentions has been found to be reciprocally related. For example,
perceived price fairness influences repurchase intentions, a spread of positive word-ofmouth, and recommendation to others (Haddad, Hallak, & Assaker, 2015). Perceived
price unfairness has a negative effect on revisit intentions (Noone & Mount, 2009) and a
positive effect on switching to another service provider (Varki & Colgate, 2001). The
bipolar measurement of perceived price fairness not only limits the full measurement of
consumers’ price fairness/unfairness perceptions but also constrains the examination of
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the relationship between price fairness perceptions and behavioral responses (Cacioppo &
Bernston, 1994).
The bivariate measurement of perceived price fairness and unfairness, in contrast,
enables the investigation of behavioral conflicts (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994) such as the
inconsistent relationship between attitude and behavior regarding blood donation
(Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994) or recycling behavior (Smith, Haugtvedt, & Petty, 1994).
Such behavioral conflicts can be observed in consumer behavior when consumers
perceive the price to be unfair but are still willing to purchase the product. This
phenomenon can be explained by acknowledging that “positive and negative evaluative
processes have some non-overlapping operating components that are opposing in their
effects on behavior and are capable of being differentially activated” (Cacioppo &
Bernston, 1994, p.411). Involvement theory implies that high- and low-involvement
consumers have different processes in evaluating the same situation (Chandrashekaran &
Grewal, 2003). Therefore, using a bivariate measurement of perceived price fairness and
unfairness, this study is equipped to fill this gap and examine the moderating role of
consumers’ involvement on the relationship among price increases, consumers' perceived
price fairness/unfairness, and booking intentions.

4.3
4.3.1

Conceptual Background and Hypotheses

Results of a Previous Study on the Bivariate Model of Perceived Price
Fairness/Unfairness

The bivariate model of perceived price fairness/unfairness and its impact on
consumers’ booking intentions were examined in the second study presented in this
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dissertation. The results of that study suggest that the magnitude of price increases
reciprocally affect perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness, and reveal that
consumers’ perceived price fairness has a stronger effect on booking intentions than
perceived price unfairness. In addition, this second study found an interaction effect
caused by hedonic vs. utilitarian situations. Based on these results, in this present
research, the situational effect acted as a control variable to test the moderating role of
consumer involvement in the research model.

Figure 4.1 Results of the Second Study

4.3.2

The Moderating Role of Consumers’ Involvement

Consumer involvement is defined as “the degree of personal relevance, interest
and/or subjective feeling of importance (Chandrashekaran & Grewal, 2003, p. 55)” about
the product/service or the purchase decision situation (Celsi & Olson, 1988). In other
words, consumers’ involvement in a situation is a temporary increase of relevance or
interest that arises at the time of a purchase decision (Park et al., 2007). Previous
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literature suggests that the same object can have different involvement levels across
people inducing a different behavioral response (Clarke & Belk, 1978) and also that the
consumers’ situational involvement influences their information evaluation process (Celsi
& Olson, 1988; Bloch & Richins, 1983; Cacioppo & Pretty, 1979, Pretty et al, 1983;
Zaichokoswsky, 1985).
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) provides a theoretical perspective on
consumers’ information evaluation processes (Pretty et al., 1983). ELM posits that highinvolvement individuals are more likely to engage in thoughtful, effortful processing via
the central route to evaluate the object whereas low-involvement individuals are more
likely to rely on the peripheral cues from the stimulus to process the information (MeyerLevy & Peracchio, 1996). ELM can be applied to behavioral pricing research
(Chandrashekaran, 2003). When consumers are exposed to a hotel’s offered price, they
assess the offered price based on their own criteria. High-involvement consumers are
more familiar with and knowledgeable about the product/service than low-involvement
consumers. Thus, high-involvement consumers employ a more advanced cognitive
process to evaluate the accuracy of offered price (Richins & Bloch, 1986). In contrast,
low-involvement consumers are likely to use simple heuristics cues such as price to
evaluate the product or service. Consequently, high- and low- involvement consumers
have different internal reference price levels for a product or service (Chandrashekaran &
Grewal, 2003).
In the context of shopping behavior with comparative advertising pricing, highinvolvement consumers are associated with product/service knowledge and the
motivation to use relevant information to evaluate the price. On the other hand, low-
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involvement consumers are associated with a low level of product/service knowledge and
the lack of motivation to engage in a detailed process of evaluation. In the case of price
increases, it is reasonable to expect that high-involvement consumers are likely to
evaluate the given situation with more information and knowledge but low-involvement
consumers may evaluate the situation simply based on the magnitude of price increases
because they do not have much knowledge and information about hotel pricing. This may
imply that low-involvement consumers are more sensitive to price increases, and that
they are more likely to perceive price increases as less fair and more unfair than highinvolvement consumers. Therefore, we hypothesize:

H1: The magnitude of price increases has a stronger impact on perceived fairness for the
low-involvement group than the high-involvement group.

H2: The magnitude of price increases has a stronger impact on perceived unfairness for
the low-involvement group than the high-involvement group.

H3: The magnitude of price increases has a stronger negative impact on booking
intentions for the low-involvement group than the high-involvement group.

Chandrashekaran (2003) found that low-involvement consumers are likely to have
a quicker and more positive response. The marketing tactics used to promote sales are
more effective for low-involvement consumers because they are unable to make precise
and comprehensive price comparisons (Bloch & Richins, 1983). Consequently, low-
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involvement consumers are likely to be more positive about supporting the
products/services whereas highly involved consumers tend to engage in more elaboration
and oppose the objects. Meanwhile, Biswas and Blair (1991) showed that highinvolvement consumers tend to be more confident of their price estimations because their
evaluation is more elaborate than those who lack knowledge and involvement with the
product/service. On the other hand, low-involvement consumers, because their evaluation
depends on simple information and rather spontaneous decisions, may be reluctant to act
in a difficult decision-making situation if they perceive the certain situation negatively
and lack strong confidence in their evaluation. As such, the high-involvement consumers
are more likely to be critical toward the object and more likely to have a negative
response than the low-involvement consumers while low-involvement consumers are less
likely to engage in significant elaboration and tend to have a more positive response
(Pretty et al., 1983). Thus, we hypothesize that:

H4: The impact of perceived price fairness on booking intentions is stronger for lowinvolvement consumers than high-involvement consumers.
H5: The impact of perceived price unfairness on booking intentions is stronger for highinvolvement consumers than low-involvement consumers.
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4.4

Methodology

4.4.1

Measurements

Table 4.1 Scenario description
Scenario 1: Sporting event (Hedonic situation)
Imagine that you were planning a trip to watch your favorite professional sports teams
play. You were planning to stay in a hotel for the game night. You found a 3-star hotel
that satisfied your needs.
Typically, you know that the average room rate for this type of hotel is $100.
Due to the football game, all hotels were expected to be fully booked on the game
night.

Scenario 2: Weather related event (Utilitarian situation)
Imagine that your neighborhood area was flooded and had a power outage due to
storm. You are planning to stay in a hotel for the night as an alternative housing. You
found a 3-star hotel that satisfied your needs.
Typically, you know the average room rate for this type of hotel is $100.
Due to the storm, all hotels were expected to be fully booked for the night of your stay.

A scenario experiment was used to manipulate experimental situations. The
questionnaire consisted of four sections. The first section assessed the participant's hotel
booking experiences (i.e. frequency of hotel booking experience within the past year,
internet booking experience, familiarity with hotel's dynamic pricing, etc.) to facilitate
participant recall of their hotel booking experiences.
After reading the randomly assigned scenario, participants were asked to indicate
the level of perceived hedonic value (i.e., fun, exciting, delightful, and thrilling) and
utilitarian value (i.e., helpful, functional, and practical) of a hotel stay in the given
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situation. These questions were used to measure the consumer’s hedonic and utilitarian
values (Voss, Spangenberg, & Grohmann, 2003) in booking a hotel under the given
situation. To capture how important the given situation is to each participant,
Zaichkowsky’s involvement measurement (1985) was modified to measure the individual
level of involvement in the experimental situation. The measurement statements of
consumer’s involvement are:
1)

It is very important to stay in a hotel in this situation.

2)

I would want to stay in a hotel in this situation.

3)

Staying in a hotel in this situation really matters to me.

Then, each participant was exposed to one of the magnitudes of room rate increases
($20/$40/$60/$80/$100) and was asked to indicate their level of perceived fairness in the
given situation, each with four measurement items: reasonable, acceptable, fair, and
justifiable (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003).
After measuring their perceived price fairness, the subjects were asked to recall
the given scenario situation and indicate the correct situation to ensure the subject
correctly envisioned themselves in the manipulated situation. This validation question
was employed to minimize the carry-over effect of the previous questions on fairness
perceptions remaining in their memory. After the validation question, the subjects were
asked to indicate their level of unfairness perceptions with four measurement items:
unreasonable, unacceptable, unfair and unjustifiable. We avoided using bipolar
continuum scales and instead used two different measurement constructs: fairness
perceptions and unfairness perceptions using a 7-Likert scale (Strongly Disagree –
Strongly Agree).
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The final section assessed the participant's demographic variables (i.e. gender,
age, education, marital status, annual household income, and employment). At the end of
the survey, we added a question to verify whether each respondent fully understood the
given situation. If a respondent chose the wrong answer, we assumed that the respondent
was not qualified to participate in the project, and their answers were eliminated.

4.4.2

Data Analysis

This study uses structural equation modeling (SEM) to analyze the relationship
among price increases, fairness and unfairness, and booking intentions. ANOVA and
MANOVA have been predominantly used to analyze quasi-experimental research. SEM
has three advantages for experimental design research (Gupta, 2014): 1) the measurement
model test enables to the use of the latent variable approach to operationalize observed
variables, 2) the structural model allows researchers to test direct and indirect causal
relationships between research constructs, and 3) the metric invariance test enables group
modeling.
The experimental situations (price increases due to hedonic and utilitarian events)
manipulated the different levels of hedonic and utilitarian values and price inequality. We
used a self-administration survey asking the respondents for their perceptions and
reactions to the manipulations. This procedure also enables a better representation of the
measurement of error and causality (Bagozzi, 1977; Rusell et al., 1998). Each
experimental manipulation can be an indicator of the true independent variable (Bagozzi,
1997, p. 224). The SEM analysis in the experimental research enables a model
measurement of error and can diagnose certain relationships or flaws in the experimental
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design. Powerful tests of manipulation effects are less likely to be biased by random or
correlated measurement errors, and the impact of these experimental manipulations can
be specified and effectively tested (Russell et al., 1998).

4.5
4.5.1

Results

Respondents’ Profiles

A total of 761 surveys were collected from Internet survey panels. Of the
respondents, 729 reported that they have experienced and are familiar with the dynamic
pricing practices of hotels. We chose only these respondents for the data analysis. Among
those respondents, outliers were retained as they reflect the random variability inherent in
a randomized assignment.
Table 4.2 shows the respondents’ demographics and profiles. Among the 729
valid respondents, 54.81% are male and 45.19% are female. The average age of
respondents is 35.13 years old with the ages ranging from 18 to 73. The average annual
household income levels indicate that 76.41% of respondents have an annual household
income of $60,000 or under and 23.59% over $60,000. The sample includes 43.82 % of
respondents who have a high school or associate's degree and 56.18% with a bachelor’s
degree or higher. 3.98% of respondents have not stayed at a hotel in the past 12 months,
75.17% of respondents have stayed at a hotel 1 to 4 times in the past 12 months, and
20.85% of respondents have stayed at a hotel more than five times in the past 12 months.
1.51% of respondents usually stay in one-star hotels, 6.88% of respondents tend to stay in
two-star hotels, 56.81% in three-star hotels, and 34.60 % of them primarily stay in four or
five-star hotels. Most respondents (99.45%) have used the internet to book a hotel.
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Table 4.2 Respondents’ Demographics (N=729)
Characteristics

Freq.

Percent

Gender

Characteristics

Freq.

Percent

Marital Status

Male

399 54.81%

Married

289

39.64%

Female

329 45.19%

Single

398

54.60%

Other

42

5.76%

Age

Total annual household income

18-20

8

1.1%

Less than $20,000

165

22.63%

21-30

305 42.84%

$20,001 - $40,000

222

30.45%

31-40

239 32.78%

$40,001 – $60,000

170

23.32%

41-50

88 12.07%

$60,001 – $80,000

86

11.80%

51-60

62

8.50%

More than $80,001

86

11.80%

61-

27

3.70%

Education

Employment

High School or equivalent

176 24.14%

Part-time employed

171

23.49%

2-year college degree

166 22.77%

Full-time employed

431

59.20%

4-year college degree

294 40.33%

Unemployed

61

8.38%

Retired

22

3.02%

Homemaker

31

4.26%

Others

12

1.62%

Graduate / Professional degree

93 12.86%

Note: Insignificant level of χ2 indicates the homogeneity of sample distribution in each group.

4.5.2

High – and Low-Involvement Group Assignment and Assessment

For the group comparison to test the moderating role of high and low involvement
in this study model, the respondents were divided into high and low groups based on their
response to three items of involvement measurement (Zaichkowsky, 1985 ; α involvement =
0.859). The mean values of involvement were significantly different between groups in a
hedonic situation and those in a utilitarian situation (μ hedonic = 5.192, μ utilitarian = 5.576, Δμ
= 0.383, t= 4.253(df = 727), p<0.001). Thus we separately divided two groups for each
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situation. The median value was used to divided high- and low-involvement groups
(Mhedonic = 5.333, Mutilitarian = 5.666). The divided cases totaled 335 (high-involvement
group) and 337 (low-involvement group).
To ensure that the distribution of two groups in our experimental setting was
random and homogeneous, a chi-squares test was conducted, which showed an
insignificant difference between the hedonic and utilitarian situations (χ2(1) = 0.315,
p>0.05) and in different levels of price increases (χ2(4) = 3.617, p>0.05).

4.5.3

Measurement Model

4.5.3.1 Overall Measurement Model
Based on Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step approach, a measurement
model using Stata ® 13 was estimated before the structural model. A confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) was first conducted to assess the measurement model and to test
reliability, construct validity, and convergent validity. All standardized factor loadings of
each construct were high, ranging between 0.885 and 0.975 and thus ensuring the
measurement had convergent validity. All Cronbach’s alpha values, as well as composite
reliability values, were above 0.9, ensuring internal consistency.
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Table 4.3 Standardized Confirmatory Factor Analysis Properties and Reliability
Factors
Perceived Price Fairness
Reasonable
Acceptable
Fair
Justifiable
Perceived Price Unfairness
Unreasonable
Unacceptable
Unfair
Unjustifiable
Booking Intentions
Willing to book
Would like to book
Will book a room

Factor
Loading

Composite
Reliability

Cronbach α
.903

.964

.905

.967

.958

.958

.962
.966
.924
.885
.964
.975
.919
.891
.903
.954
.964

Table 4.4 Measure Correlations, Squared Correlations, and Average Variance Extracted
(AVE)
PPF
Perceived Price Fairness
Perceived Price Unfairness
(squared correlations)
Booking Intentions
(squared correlations)
AVE
Mean
SD

PPUF

BI

1.00
-.842**
(.598)
.764**
(.583)
.881
3.795
1.756

1.00
-.706
(.498)
.857
4.190
1.844

1.00
.885
4.074
1.794

Note: ** p< 0.01 * p<0.01
Model Measurement Fit: χ2 =219.96, df =38 (p< 0.01), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
[RMSEA] = .080, Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .985, Tucker-Lewis Index [TLI] = .978
AVE = Sum of squared standardized loading / (Sum of squared standardized loading + sum of indicator
measurement error)
Composite reliability = Squared sum of loading / (squared sum of loading + sum of indicator)

As shown in Table 4.4, the average variance extracted (AVE) numbers from two
constructs exceed the cut-off criterion of 0.5, and are greater than the squared correlations
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of perceived price unfairness and perceived price fairness. This proves that the
measurement has convergent validity and discriminant validity. The CFA on three latent
variables (perceived fairness, perceived unfairness, and booking intentions) with eleven
observed variables show the goodness-of-fit indices (χ2 =219.96, df=38, p< 0.01), root
mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .080, comparative fit index [CFI] =
.985, and Tucker-Lewis Index [TLI] = .978.

4.5.3.2 Test for Invariance Comparing High vs. Low Involvement
The hypothesized moderating role of high- and low-involvement in determining
perceived price fairness, perceived price unfairness, and booking intentions was assessed
using a series of modeling tests for metric invariance.
A measurement invariance test was conducted to verify invariance across highlow involved respondents (Acock, 2013). A non-constraint model (none group) was
assessed and compared to the full-metric invariance model for high-low involved
respondents. The results of the test for metric invariance comparing high-low
involvement showed significant differences, so the equal loading model was rejected.
Post estimation was conducted to detect the problematic loadings and found that the
construct of booking intentions has a different loading for high and low involvements.
Instead of using the construct of booking intentions, we used the single item of booking
intentions “I would like to a book a room at the given room rate” as a dependent variable
to conduct the path analysis to test the hypothesis.
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The measurement invariance test results for the modified measurement model are
summarized in Table 4.5. The results show that the chi-square difference of the
likelihood-ratio test between the constraint invariance model and the full-metric
invariance model is non-significant, ensuring that our modified model is valid to test the
group comparison for both high- and low-involvement groups.

Table 4.5 Test for Metric Invariance Comparing for High- and Low- Involvement Groups
χ2(df)

RMSEA

CFI

TLI

Δ χ2(df)

Constraint model

108.943(32)

0.081

0.991

0.985

Full metric model

116.134(38)

0.075

0.991

0.987

8.809(6)
P >0.05 (NS)

Model

4.5.4

Structural Equation Model for Group Comparison

A structural equation model using Stata® 13 was applied to estimate the
relationships among price increases, perceived fairness, perceived unfairness, and
booking intentions. The SEM results indicate a goodness-of-fit statistics (χ2 =170.56,
df=35, p< 0.0001, RMSEA= 0.073, CFI =0.986, TLI = 0.979) for bivariate measurements
of perceived unfairness and perceived fairness. The overall model (without group
comparison) has been addressed in the previous (Chapter 3) work. Although we used the
modified model (inclusion of a control variable of the situation and a latent variable of
booking intentions with a single item instead of the measurement construct of booking
intentions), the results are not different from the second study. Thus, we proceeded to
analyze the group comparison model for the low-involvement group and highinvolvement group.
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Table 4.6 Results of SEM and Group Comparison
Overall

Group comparison model
Baseline model

Constraint model

170.56 (35)

223.141 (85)

204.151(77)

p < 0.001

p <0.001

p <0.001

RMSEA

0.073

0.070

0.070

CFI

0.986

0.985

0.986

TFI

0.979

0.981

0.981

χ2 (df)

PI  Fair (H1)
PI  Unfair (H2)
PI  BI (H3)
Situation a) Fair
Situation
a)

Low-

High-

involvement

involvement

N=335

N=337

Group invariance: χ2 (df)

-.505***

-.545***

-.480***

4.253(1), p<0.05

Support

.510***

.521***

.478***

0.011(1), NS

Not

***

***

***

2.478(1), NS

Not

7.550(1),

Support

-.157
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Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Figure 4.2 The Results of SEM

A baseline model and a constraint model of the group comparison model were
generated based on the full-metric invariance model. The results indicate that the baseline
model for both groups parsimoniously fits to the data (χ2 =223.141, df=85, p< 0.001,
RMSEA= 0.070, CFI =0.985, TLI = 0.981). This baseline model was compared with a
constraint model whose structural coefficients are constrained to be equal. The results of
modeling comparisons using a chi-square difference test are presented in Table 4.6; the
joint test results for group invariance of each parameter show a significant level of
difference (Δ χ2 = 18.276(7), p<0.05), revealing that there is an overall moderating effect
of high and low involvement in the research model. The results show that the paths from
price increases to perceived price fairness (Δ χ2 = 4.253(1), p<0.05), perceived price
unfairness to booking intentions (Δ χ2 = 5.258(1), p<0.05), and perceived price fairness to
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booking intentions (Δ χ2 = 7.550(1), p<0.01) significantly differed across high and low
involvement groups (Figure 4.2). This implies that high and low involvement moderate a)
the effect of price increases on perceived price fairness, b) the effect of perceived price
fairness on booking intentions, and c) the effect of perceived price unfairness on booking
intentions. Thus, H1, H4, and H5 were supported. However, the effect of price increases
on perceived unfairness (Δ χ2 = 0.011(1), p>0.05) and the effect of price increases on
booking intentions (Δ χ2 = 2.478(1), p>0.05) are not significantly different between the
high-involvement group and the low-involvement group, indicating that there is no
moderating effect of involvement in the relationship between price increases and
perceived price unfairness, and between price increases and booking intentions.

4.5.5

Additional Findings- Hedonic vs. Utilitarian Situation

Additional group comparisons were conducted to compare the hedonic vs.
utilitarian situations for each high and low involvement group (Figure 4.3). This analysis
is exploratory in nature and as such these are findings for which no hypotheses have been
constructed. The main research model was controlled by a situation dummy variable. As
the second study demonstrated, the hedonic and utilitarian situations have a significant
interaction effect in the research model. Thus, additional analysis offers a broad view of
the moderating role of involvement in the relationship among price increases, perceived
price fairness or unfairness, and booking intentions in each hedonic and utilitarian
situation.
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The results of the additional analysis affirm the main findings:
1. Consumers’ perceived price fairness, rather than perceived price unfairness, is the
stronger driver for booking intentions for both high-and low-involvement consumers.
2. Low-involvement consumers have a more sensitive perceptions of price fairness
regarding price increases than high-involvement consumers.
3. The effect of perceived price fairness on booking intentions is stronger for lowinvolvement consumers than high-involvement consumers.
4. However, the effect of perceived price unfairness on booking intentions is stronger
for high-involvement consumers than low-involvement consumers. This result only
applies to the hedonic situation. In the utilitarian situation, perceived price unfairness
does not have any significant impact on booking intentions.
These unique findings from the additional analysis reveal that in the utilitarian
situation, consumers’ perceived price unfairness does not have a significant impact on
booking intentions regardless of level of involvement. Although there is no significant
moderating effect of involvement on the path relationship in the hedonic situation, the
result of the joint test invariance across high- and low-involvement shows an overall
moderating effect in the model (Δ χ2 = 18.052(4), p<0.05).

103

Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

Figure 4.3 The Results of Additional SEM

4.6

Conclusion

4.6.1

Discussion

This study demonstrates the moderating role of consumers’ involvement in the
relationship among price increases, perceived price fairness and unfairness, and booking
intentions. Three major findings emerge from the results of SEM analysis. First, highinvolvement consumers are less sensitive to price increases than low-involvement
consumers. More specifically, price increases have a stronger effect on perceived price
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fairness (i.e., consumers perceive price increases as less fair) in low-involvement
consumers than in high-involvement consumers. As previous studies on reference price
suggest (Chandrashekaran & Grewal, 2003; Richins & Bloch, 1986), low-involvement
consumers are susceptible to simple cues such as price information when making a
purchasing decision whereas high-involvement consumers do not only have price
information but also their subjective standards, norms, and market knowledge to evaluate
the offered deal. Thus, although high-involvement consumers may consider the hotel’s
dynamic pricing to be a business norm, this may not restrict RM operation.
Second, the effect of perceived price fairness on booking intentions is stronger for
low-involvement consumers than high-involvement consumers. This result is in
agreement with Chandrashekaran and Grewal (2003)’s findings that low-involvement
consumers more easily and quickly accept a positively-evaluated event than highinvolvement consumers. Thus, simple marketing tactics easily tempt low-involvement
consumers to engage in in spontaneous shopping (Biswas & Blair, 1991). Third, the
negative effect of perceived price unfairness on booking intentions is not significant for
low-involvement consumers but significant for high-involvement consumers. This may
be because low-involvement consumers have low confidence in their judgment of price
unfairness(Biswas & Blair, 1991), which makes them reluctant to rely on their perceived
price unfairness. However, high-involvement consumers may have robust evaluation
standards regarding about price increases, so their judgment of price increases may have
a significant effect on their booking intentions.
Fourth, although high-involvement consumers are responsive to perceived price
unfairness that decreases booking intentions, the relative magnitude of perceived price
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fairness’ effect on booking intentions is significantly stronger than that of perceived price
unfairness (z= 25.71, p<0.001 for low-involvement consumers; z = 4.30, p<0.001 for
high-involvement consumers). Thus, this study confirmed that consumers’ perceived
price fairness is the stronger driver of booking intentions regardless of the degree of the
consumers’ involvement in the booking situations.
Additional analysis confirms the interpretation that perceived price unfairness has
non-significant impact on booking intentions for both high- and low- involvement
consumers in the utilitarian situation, as was suggested by the results of the previous
work (Chapter 3). That is, in the utilitarian situation, regardless of how important the
situation is, consumers who perceived price increases as unfair would, nevertheless, book
a room during excess demand events such as severe weather. Urbany, Madden et al.
(1989) also identified this inconsistent behavioral response to perceived unfairness,
demonstrating that consumers are willing to begrudgingly pay unfair prices despite
complaining about the unfairness of pricing. These results should not be interpreted as
proving that perceived unfairness is not an important factor for consumers’ behavioral
responses in a utilitarian situation because this study did not include negative behavioral
responses such as negative word or mouth and complaints. When consumers feel at odds
with a choice mandated by circumstances (the utilitarian situation), post responses might
include purchase withdrawal, buyer’s remorse, complaining behavior, revenge, and
impaired trust (Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004) which were not covered in this research.
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4.6.2

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The findings of this research have novel theoretical implications for the
moderating role of involvement in the relationship among price increases, perceived price
fairness / perceived price unfairness, and booking intentions. We first witness that the
moderating effect of involvement significantly differs between utilitarian situations and
hedonic situations. Consumer involvement refers to the cognitive process used to
evaluate the given situation (Richins & Bloch, 1986). The fact that the moderating effect
of involvement is stronger in a utilitarian situation, in which consumers engage in
decision-making based on a logical information process (Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982),
than in hedonic situations, in which decisions are based on an affective process
(Hirschman & Holbrook, 1982), is noteworthy.
Secondly, the bivariate structure of perceived price fairness and perceived price
unfairness contributed to finding distinctive relationships between perceived price
fairness and booking intentions, as well as between perceived price unfairness and
booking intentions. The bivariate structure enabled comparisons to show that perceived
price fairness and perceived price unfairness differently influence consumers’ behavioral
responses. However, most researchers have used a binary (Kahneman et al., 1986;
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Urbany et al., 1989) or bipolar scale (Beldona &
Kwansa, 2008; Campbell, 1999a, 1999b, 2007; Choi & Mattila, 2003; Heo & Lee, 2011;
Kimes & Wirtz, 2003) to measure price fairness perceptions. Within the reciprocal frame
of fair or unfair given by a binary or bipolar measurement structure, it would have been
impossible to identify distinctive relationships between perceived fairness and booking
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intentions and between perceived price unfairness and booking intentions (Cacioppo, et
al., 1997).
Understanding how consumers’ involvement affects a booking decision is
imperative for hotel management. The results of this study present three important
considerations for hotel operators and RM managers. First, the effect of perceived price
fairness on booking intentions was found to be more powerful than that of the effect of
perceived price unfairness. Thus, hotel management might consider promoting
consumers’ perceived price fairness rather than reducing perceived unfairness to attract
more consumers to book their hotels.
Second, the results revealed that high-involvement consumers are less sensitive to
price increases. This implies that the more the consumer is involved in hotel’s dynamic
pricing and booking situation, the more likely s/he is to have other criteria for making a
booking decision. Thus, the hotel management should build a close relationship with the
customers to provide various information to be stored in the consumers’ memory and
activated when the consumer makes booking decisions.
Third, this research showed that perceived price unfairness has no significant
effect on booking intentions in the utilitarian situation. However, it should not be
interpreted to mean that hotel operators can ignore perceived price unfairness in
utilitarian situations. This study did not measure negative behavioral responses such as
negative word of mouth and consumer complaints. In utilitarian situations, particularly in
case of excess demand, hotel operators and managers should rather consider that they
may have customers who begrudgingly book a hotel room because they need a place to
stay. Although this research did not explore the long-term impact of customers’ feeling
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forced to accept an unfair option, it is important to consider both short-term and longterm impacts of consumers’ responses to dynamic pricing.
This study manipulated price increase situations that occur due to excess demand.
The excess demand situations were designed to be a sporting event and a weather-related
event. In real life, although weather-related events are beyond human control, most
external events can be planned and managed by cooperating with local government (such
as the Convention and Visitors bureau) or event organizers. Not only hotel managers, but
also professionals and organizations in event management, can collaborate with the hotel
industry to create and host large events to promote travel and boost hotel demand. As
high-involvement consumers are less sensitive to price increases, hosting large events
that attract a large population of highly involved consumers will benefit hotels. Hotel
managers should cooperate with event professionals to make events more relevant to
attendees, so as to promote consumers’ perceived price fairness and to reduce consumers’
perceived price unfairness.

4.6.3

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Several limitations of this study should be considered when interpreting the
results for future studies. First, this study manipulated experimental situations, a 3-star
hotel visit for a hedonic event (a sporting event) and a utilitarian event (a weather related
event), which were controlled in the research model. Therefore, these results may be
limited in their application to other hotel settings, and only applicable to a general
situation during a time of high hotel room rates. This was an intentional choice in this
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study; we compromised on examining detailed relationships under more diverse event
situations in order to pursue more generalizable results.
Second, there are a variety of events that cause excess demand in the hotel market
such as sport ‘participation’ events (as opposed to ‘watching’ events), political events,
concerts, academic conferences, business conventions, and so on. The various types of
events may have different characteristics and motivations for consumers.
Third, a unidimensional construct of booking intentions was used to test the
model due to the equal loading of measurement issue. Future studies may benefit from
applying the latent variable of booking intentions with multi-dimensions to gain a more
robust model.
Fourth, this research tested only booking intentions as behavioral responses.
Negative behavioral intentions such as switching intentions, complaints and negative
word-of-mouth would be able to show the extensive relationships with the bivariate
structure of perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness.
Lastly, this research uses the same data as that used in the previous (second)
study. Although we include the new variable of involvement, which had not been used in
the previous study, fresh data might have been beneficial to reconfirm and extend the
previous study. Future studies may extend the findings of this research by integrating
personal variables (demographic and psychographics) to reveal further relationships
among the study constructs.
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In this non-traditional dissertation format, this last chapter summarizes the
results of all of the research, integrates the findings from three studies, and offers
conclusions regarding the findings.

The purpose of this dissertation was to understand how consumers perceive and
respond to hotels’ room rate increases as a result of external events that drive excess
demand. First, we examined the contextual effect of external events when consumers
evaluate hotel room rates. Second, we investigated our suspicion that the conventional
measurement of perceived price fairness—using bipolar continuum scales of perceived
price fairness (very unfair – very fair)—does not sufficiently measure consumers’
perceived fairness and unfairness. Third, we questioned how different levels of
individuals’ involvement could influence their evaluation of increased room rates and
their booking intention.
The three studies in chapters 2, 3 and 4 have empirically examined the effects of
dynamic pricing (price increases) on consumers’ perceived price fairness and unfairness,
and booking intention in hedonic and utilitarian situations. The research created the
scenarios to manipulate the experimental situations for different levels of price increases
in hedonic or utilitarian events. The experimental scenarios were employed for all three
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studies. Each study, however, identified unique problems and attempted to find
methodological solutions and factors to examine the effects of dynamic pricing on
consumers’ responses.
This chapter summarizes and integrates the three studies and their major findings.
The theoretical and practical implications of the research, as well as its limitations, are
addressed.

5.1

Summary of Major Findings

Study 1 focused on examining the measurement of perceived fairness and
unfairness. Many researchers have considered the mid-point responses in bipolar scales
meaningless or variable depending on different respondents (Sherif & Hovland, 1961); as
a result, mid-point responses have often been removed in market research (Dolnicar,
2013). Study 1 used a two-step process to measure consumers’ perceived fairness and
unfairness: 1) a binary scale to identify the direction (fair or unfair), and 2) an ordinal
scale to capture the magnitude of the perceived fairness and unfairness. The result of
Study 1 showed that as the room rate increased, consumers perceived it to be more unfair,
but not less fair. The results verified the assertion that price increases are associated with
perceived unfairness rather than perceived fairness. Therefore, the continued use of
perceived fairness/unfairness measurement with bipolar techniques (very fair – very
unfair) could be problematic.
The two-step process forced respondents to select their direction—fair or unfair—
and ignore the mid-point of bipolar scales of perceived price fairness/unfairness. This
type of process could be beneficial for researchers and marketers to obtain unambiguous
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responses from consumers (Dolnicar, 2013) while avoiding the neutral response.
However, the meaning of mid-point (neutral) of bipolar scales is debatable. Although
many researchers consider the mid-point to be meaningless (Dolnicar, 2013), others
consider it to have various meanings (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Cacioppo & Bernston,
1994).
Study 2 adapted the bivariate structure of positive and negative evaluation
framework (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) to test the
distinction of fairness and unfairness constructs. The results confirmed fairness and
unfairness as separate constructs. With the distinction of fairness and unfairness, our
research model tested the relationship between price increases, fairness, unfairness, and
booking intention. Study 2 found that price increases reciprocally affected both fairness
(-) and unfairness (+) perceptions, rejecting the hypothesis that the effect of price
increases is stronger on unfairness than on fairness. This hypothesis was supported in
Study 1 using the two-step (binary-ordinal) measurement of fairness and unfairness. The
result of Study 2 found that perceived fairness rather than perceived unfairness has a
stronger effect on booking intentions. This result contradicts the notion of negative
dominance, which is common in price fairness perception research and suggests that
“losses loom larger.”
The distinction of fairness and unfairness enables scholars to capture the full
range of consumers’ perception about price increases. It can be applied to measure
positive and negative evaluation (Cacioppo & Bernston, 1994), attitudinal response
(Wilson et al., 2000), emotional response (Larsen & McGraw, 2014), and behavioral
response (Caccioppo, Gardner, & Bernston, 1997). Using the bivariate structure of
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fairness and unfairness, we discovered that consumers had ambivalent perceptions that
included both fairness and unfairness. The ambivalent perceptions were ignored when we
used the two-step measurements of binary and ordinal (in Study 1) and could be viewed
as meaningless when using bipolar scales.
The result of Study 2 showed that consumers’ fairness and unfairness perceptions
worked differently on their booking intention depending on whether the situation was
hedonic or utilitarian. In hedonic situations, consumers’ unfairness perceptions did
negatively affect their booking intentions. Contrastingly, in utilitarian situations
consumers’ unfairness perceptions did not significant impact their booking intentions.
However, fairness was a driver of booking intentions for both hedonic and utilitarian
situations.
Additionally, before this research, we knew little regarding how consumers’
involvement with a service provider affects their perceptions about price fairness and any
subsequent behaviors because of their level of involvement. Study 3 tested consumers’
different level of involvement and how it affected their fairness and unfairness about
price increases and its effect on booking intentions. High-involvement consumers were
less sensitive about price increases when they evaluated price fairness. For highinvolvement consumers, hotel room rate could be one of many criteria on their minds
during the booking process. High-involvement consumers would tend to invest more time
and effort to find the best available rooms. However, low-involvement consumers would
put in less effort to book a hotel room. Thus, for these consumers price information could
be a key criterion to book a hotel room, and they might be easily tempted by price
information.
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Three studies empirically examined the relationship among price increases,
fairness/unfairness, and booking intentions. Study 1 and 2 employed different
measurement techniques to find the superior measurement to capture the full range of
price perceptions. The bivariate measurement model in Study 2 was sufficient to
represent consumers’ perceptions of fairness, unfairness and mixed perceptions of
fairness and unfairness. The bivariate measurement model allowed Study 2 and Study 3
to investigate the differences in the hedonic and utilitarian situations and in high and low
involvement in the research model.

5.2

Summary of the Three Studies

The results of the first study indicate that price increases and hedonic vs.
utilitarian situations have significant effects on perceived price unfairness but not on
perceived price fairness. This finding empirically verifies the separable activation of price
fairness and perceived price unfairness, calling into question whether a bipolar continuum
scale of price fairness perceptions (extremely (very) unfair – extremely (very) fair) is
sufficient to measure perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness.
The second study conceptually discusses both reciprocal and non-reciprocal
relationships between perceived price fairness and perceived price unfairness and
empirically tests the bivariate measurement of perceived price fairness and unfairness.
The CFA of the bivariate measurement model results confirms the functional
independence of perceived price fairness and unfairness. The test for metric invariances
ensures that the bivariate model is valid for both hedonic and utilitarian situations. By
using the bivariate measurement model, the research found:
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1) Price increases reciprocally affect both perceived fairness (-) and unfairness (+) at
a similar degree of effect, rejecting the research hypothesis that the effect of price
increases is stronger on perceived unfairness than on perceived fairness.
2) Perceived price fairness, rather than perceived price unfairness, has stronger effect
on booking intention, rejecting the hypothesis and the common notion that ‘losses
loom larger’ due to negative bias.
3) The test for metric invariance for group comparison found that the hedonic and
utilitarian situations moderate the relationship between perceived price fairness
and booking intentions, as well as between perceived price unfairness and
booking intentions. In the hedonic situation, perceived price unfairness has a
significant effect on booking intentions, but has a non-significant effect in the
utilitarian situation. The relationship between perceived price fairness and
booking intention is stronger in the utilitarian situation than in the hedonic
situation. However, for both situations, perceived price fairness, rather than
perceived price unfairness has a stronger impact on booking intentions.

The third study examines the moderating role of consumers' involvement in the
relationship among the magnitude of price increases, perceived price fairness and
perceived price unfairness, and hotel booking intention. The major findings are:
1) Low-involvement consumers have more sensitive perceptions of price fairness in
response to price increases than high-involvement consumers.
2) The effect of perceived price fairness on booking intention is stronger for lowinvolvement consumers than high-involvement consumers.
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3) The effect of perceived price unfairness on booking intentions is stronger for
high-involvement consumers than low-involvement consumers.
4) In spite of the significant moderating role found between high- and lowinvolvement consumers, consumers’ perceived price fairness, rather than
perceived price unfairness, is the stronger driver for booking intentions for both
high- and low-involvement consumers.
5) The moderating effect of involvement is significant in the utilitarian situation but
not as significant in the hedonic situation.

5.3
5.3.1

Key Findings

Bivariate structure of perceived price fairness and unfairness

The central question of this dissertation is how consumers evaluate price increases
as fair, unfair, or in another way. Many researchers have conjectured that perceived price
fairness and perceived price unfairness are conceptually different, but none have
attempted to measure fairness and unfairness separately. The first study used the two-step
measurement recommended by Dolnicar (2013). The results of the first study show
empirically separable activation of perceived price fairness and unfairness, casting a
doubt on the assumption that the bipolar continuum scales of perceived price fairness and
unfairness are adequate for measuring consumers’ price fairness perceptions. However,
the two-step measurement that was used in the first study to assist in finding the
separability of fairness and unfairness is not sufficient. Two-step measurement was
designed to avoid meaningless neutrality. It forced subjects to choose their position fair
or unfair, then measure the magnitude of perceived fairness and perceived unfairness.
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Thus, this measurement could neither identify ambivalent perceptions (fair and unfair)
nor indifference (less fair and less unfair) and cannot capture the combination of
consumers’ perceived fairness and unfairness.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the different activation of perceived fairness and
unfairness when it is measured by a binary scale (study 1) and by bivariate scale (study
2). When consumers were asked to evaluate each experimental manipulation (price
increases in the hedonic vs. utilitarian situation), binary scales tended to capture more
unfair options. It is clear to identify that the co-activated mode in the bivariate
measurement is merged into unfair in a binary measurement. The results of the first study
demonstrate that price increases and the hedonic or utilitarian nature of the situation have
significant effects on the level of perceived unfairness, but not on the level of perceived
fairness. That is, as price increases, consumers perceive it to be more unfair, but not
necessarily less fair.
The first study shows that price increases have a significant impact on perceived
unfairness but not on perceived fairness. However, the second study shows nonsignificant difference in the effect of price increases on perceived fairness and perceived
unfairness. The comparison of these results from the first study and the second study
implies that the bivariate structure of perceived fairness and unfairness can reduce an
apriori assumed negative dominance.
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of Consumers’ Price Fairness Perceptions by Measurement
method (Binary vs. Bivariate)

The SEM results in study 2 and 3 demonstrate that regardless of hedonic vs.
utilitarian situations or degree of involvement, perceived price fairness has a stronger
effect on booking intentions. These results also dispute the assumptions of negative
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potency (i.e., “negative entities are stronger than the equivalent positive entities”: Rozin
& Royzman, 2001) and negativity bias (“a positive affect does not have an effect on
measured behavior oppositely equivalent to the effect of a negative affect”: Jordan, 1965,
p. 315). However, Rozin and Royzman also point out that “although negativity bias is
often striking, it is far from universal” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001, p. 297). The stronger
effect of perceived price fairness on booking intentions is supported by “the positivity
offset” described by Cacioppo et al. as the idea that “the motivation to approach is
stronger than the motivation to avoid” in a condition of repeated exposure to familiar
stimuli (not extreme ones) (1997). These results could not have been revealed if
consumers’ price fairness perceptions had been measured by the predominant method of
bipolar continuum measurement.

5.3.2

Hedonic vs. Utilitarian Situations

The hotel business is susceptible to external events such as sporting events, mega
events, cultural events, and weather-related events, etc. which can frame the consumers’
motivation for booking hotel rooms. Consumers’ price perceptions are subjective and
sensitive to situational contexts. Despite the important role that external events play in
hotel pricing and influencing consumers’ price perceptions, situational contexts have not
been highlighted in the research on perceived price fairness. These studies provide an
important theoretical contribution to the literature by incorporating situational contexts in
price fairness perception research within the hospitality and tourism discipline. The
findings of the study showed that the effect of price increases on perceived fairness and
perceived unfairness does not differ by situation; however, the effects of perceived price
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fairness and unfairness on booking intention were found to be different between the
hedonic and utilitarian situation. The critical finding from the research is how, given
consumers in an utilitarian situation, the effect of perceived unfairness on booking
intention is insignificant.

5.3.3

Involvement

Extensive research on RM has been devoted to identifying moderating factors that
influence consumers’ unfairness perceptions. Familiarity and knowledge (information)
were frequently tested to prove their moderating effect on consumers’ perceived price
fairness about hotels’ RM practices. However, consumers’ involvement has not yet been
studied in price perceptions research in the field of hospitality and tourism management.
The current research has contributed to the applicable literature by extending the
theory of involvement to consumers’ price fairness perceptions research streams. The
results revealed that high-involvement consumers are less sensitive to room rate increases
than low-involvement consumers. It is important to note that low-involvement
consumers are more sensitive to price increases but their price evaluation is less sensitive
to their booking intentions. Contrastingly, high-involvement consumers are less sensitive
to price increases but their price evaluation is more sensitive to their booking intentions.
The results showed that low-involvement consumers are easily affected by simple
information on room rates, but their behavioral response is not as predictable as highinvolvement consumers’ behavioral response.
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5.4

Implications

This dissertation has the following theoretical implications. First, the present
study challenges classic work on the fairness principle of “dual entitlement”. Most
research on perceived price fairness have referred to “dual entitlement” as a basic
theoretical foundation that limited sellers’ ability to apply demand driven pricing.
However, this research shows that consumers accept demand driven pricing as a common
practice in the hotel industry for a certain level of price increase during high demand
situations. The fairness principle proposed by Kahneman and his colleges (1986) is not as
strong as it was, at least in the hotel industry.
This research identifies two factors that moderate fairness perceptions: external
events and individual’s involvement. This study confirms that external events function as
a contextual factor, affecting consumers’ perceived price about a hotel stay. This study
adapts hedonic and utilitarian consumption theories to extend the discussion on
contextual effects on pricing. External events depending on hedonic vs. utilitarian
situations influence consumers’ perceived fair price of a hotel room differently. The
results of Study 1 showed that consumers increased their perceived fair prices of the
room rate from $100 to $129 for a hedonic event and $118 for a utilitarian event. The
increase in perceived price could be interpreted as the contextual value of a hotel room
rate. According to this interpretation, although both hedonic and utilitarian situations add
perceived value to a hotel stay, a hedonic event adds more value to a hotel stay than a
utilitarian event.
Second, this research extend the application of the theory of involvement to
consumers’ price fairness perceptions and reference price research in the hotel industry.
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The findings of this research confirm the moderating role of involvement in consumers’
response to dynamic pricing. Furthermore, this research elaborates the different
consequences of the moderating effect of involvement between hedonic and utilitarian
situations. It is noteworthy that utilitarian situations in which consumers engage in
decision-making based on a logical information process enhance the moderating effect of
involvement more than hedonic situations in which decisions rely heavily on an affective
process (Hirshman & Holbrook, 1982; Richins & Bloch, 1986).
Lastly, the critical contribution of this research is the bivariate measurement of
fairness and unfairness. The bivariate measurement enabled us to test separable activation
of negative and positive evaluation, providing empirical evidence that fairness and
unfairness are distinguishable and functionally independent. Two different constructs of
fairness and unfairness enable researchers to identify the structural relationship amongst
antecedent factors, fairness, unfairness and consequences in the different contexts.
The bivariate measurement of fairness and unfairness also allows us to capture the
full range of consumers’ price perceptions, including ambivalent perceptions. By using a
binary scale or a bipolar scale of fairness and unfairness, respondents who have
ambivalent perception might tend to choose the negative option due to negative bias
(Cacioppo et al., 1997). However, the bivariate measurement allows people to evaluate
the given price in both a positive way and negative way, thus capturing mixed
(ambivalent) perceptions. The bivariate measurement also enables us to reduce negative
bias. The bivariate measurement model can apply to testing attitudes (mixed attitude:
positive attitude and negative attitude: Cacciopo & Bernston, 1994) and emotions (mixed
emotion: sad and happy: Williams & Aaker, 2002). Therefore, this study suggests the
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bivariate measurement as an adequate method to measure consumers’ positive-negative
mediation in hospitality and tourism research.
Marketing research often avoids mid-point and neutral responses, because many
researchers consider mid-point responses to be meaningless (Dolnicar, 2013). Other
words for neutral are “undecided” or “ambivalent.” From the marketers’ perspective,
natural responses can be opportunistic targets that could change neutral positions to
positive ones (or undecided ones to positive ones). While mid-point / neutral is
considered to be a meaningless point in bipolar scales, it could be meaningful when using
bivariate measurement. The bivariate measurement model enabled us to test separable
activation of negative and positive evaluation, providing empirical evidence that fairness
and unfairness are distinguishable and functionally independent. Two different constructs
of fairness and unfairness enable researcher to identify structural relationship amongst
antecedent factors, fairness, unfairness and consequences in the different contexts.
The bivariate measurement of fairness and unfairness also allows us to capture
full ranges of consumers’ price perceptions. It enables to identify ambivalent
perceptions. By using a binary scale of fairness and unfairness, ambivalent perceptions
might belong to the unfairness perceptions. Due to the negative bias, people tend to
choose negative option if they have mixed perceptions. However, the bivariate
measurement allows people to evaluate the given price in positive way and negative way;
it could capture the mixed (ambivalent) perceptions. The bivariate measurement also
enables to reduce the negative bias. The bivariate measurement model can apply to test
attitudes (mixed attitude: positive attitude and negative attitude: Cacciopo & Bernston,
1994) and emotions (mixed emotion: sad and happy: Williams & Aaker, 2002).
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Therefore, this study suggest the bivariate measurement as an adequate method to
measure consumers’ positive-negative mediation in the hospitality and tourism research.
This dissertation also offered several practical implications for the hotel industry,
CVB (Convention and Visitors Bureau), local governments (destination marketing
organization), and consumers. In reality, during times of excess demand, consumers’
perceived price fairness/unfairness or consumers’ booking intention might appear to be
irrelevant in the short term because hotel rooms could be fully booked by consumers who
pay a premium to book a hotel room to enjoy a favorite event night or to escape an
uncomfortable / inconvenient situation (i.e., severe weather). However, it is of practical
importance to note that external events increase consumers’ perceived price of a hotel
stay. In particular, the results of this study showed that the effect of hedonic events is
larger than the effect of utilitarian events on consumers’ perceived price of a hotel stay.
When hotels can maintain high room rates due to external events over time, it helps
hotels increase their reference price (Viglia, Mauri, & Carricano, 2016). Therefore,
hotels should collaborate with local government and event organizers to create more
hedonic rather than utilitarian events such as sporting, entertainment, local festivals, and
musical events to promote demand, which increases hotel room rates and thereby helps
hotels increase their reference prices.
The critical implication of this research for hotel operators and managers is that in
the utilitarian situation consumers’ unfairness perceptions do not negatively affect
booking intentions. Although consumers perceive an expensive hotel room rate to be
unfair, they would book a hotel anyway. In this case, while consumers’ unfairness
perception does not function to control the level of demand, hotels might nevertheless
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face the serious and notorious problem of price gouging. Hotel managers heavily rely on
a hotel revenue management system, a sophisticated and complicated computer program
to set optimal room rates based on the demand forecast (El Gayar et al., 2011). By
tracking current booking activities, a hotel revenue management system changes room
rates every second (Ivanov & Zhechev, 2012). So if consumers book a hotel room in spite
of their unfairness perceptions about high room rates, the revenue management system
will keep raising room rates to maximize revenue and profit. If hotel revenue
management managers only rely on this system, they may unwittingly indulge in price
gouging.
The non-significant relationship between perceived unfairness and booking
intentions could be interpreted as allowing hotel operators to ignore consumers’
unfairness perceptions during a utilitarian situation. According to Maxwell (2002), the
relative power of the buyer and seller influences fair/unfair relationships. If consumers
have alternative options, room rate increases might not tend to be perceived as
unfavorably, or unfair. In these types of circumstances hotels might consider cooperating
with local governmental and other public organizations and associations to accommodate
consumers’ needs for alternative housing. Public shelters or Airbnb could easily expand a
limited supply of hotel rooms during high demand in utilitarian situations.
The uncertain and unpredictable relationship between perceived price unfairness
and booking intentions could pose a potential risk to hotel managers. From a management
perspective, it would be more difficult to handle consumers who reluctantly booked a
room. Consumers who felt the price was unfair when they booked the hotel might have a
negative mood when they stay or exhibit complicated behavioral responses (Rozin and
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Royzman, 2001). Xia and her colleagues suggested (2004) that when unfairness
perceptions accompany negative emotions, the consequences could be more severe.
Therefore, in the utilitarian situation, hotel operators and managers should make extra
efforts to prevent any unpredictable risk.
The bivariate nature of consumers’ fairness and unfairness perceptions could
provide practical implications for hotel managers and marketers. The bivariate structure
of fairness and unfairness demonstrated that consumers might have ambivalent
perceptions of fairness and unfairness. Hotel managers should consider consumers
perceived fairness and unfairness separately with awareness of the fact that consumers do
not necessarily have simply fair or unfair judgments about hotel room rates. When people
have ambivalent perceptions, fairness perceptions are more powerful than unfairness in
driving them to have positive behavioral response. Therefore, hotel management might
consider promoting perceived fairness rather than reducing perceived unfairness.
This dissertation discovered that different levels of involvement moderate the
relationship among price increases, perceptions of fairness and unfairness, and booking
intentions. High-involvement consumers have a less sensitive perception of fairness and
unfairness in regard to price increases. This implies that the more the consumer is
involved in hotels’ dynamic pricing and booking situation, the more likely s/he is to have
other criteria for making a booking decision. Thus, the hotel management should build a
close relationship with the customers to provide various information to be stored in the
consumers’ memory and activated when the consumer makes booking decisions.
This research showed that perceived price unfairness has no significant effect on
booking intentions in the utilitarian situation. However, it should not be interpreted to

127
mean that hotel operators can ignore perceived price unfairness in utilitarian situations.
This study did not measure negative behavioral responses such as negative word of
mouth and consumer complaints. In utilitarian situations, particularly in case of excess
demand, hotel operators and managers should rather consider that they may have
customers who begrudgingly book a hotel room because they need a place to stay.
Although this research did not explore the long-term impact of customers’ feeling forced
to accept an unfair option, it is important to consider both short-term and long-term
impacts of consumers’ responses to dynamic pricing.
This study manipulated price increase situations that occur due to excess demand.
The excess demand situations were designed to be a sporting event and a weather-related
event. In real life, although weather-related events are beyond human control, most
external events can be planned and managed by cooperating with local government (such
as the Convention and Visitors bureau) or event organizers. Not only hotel managers, but
also professionals and organizations in event management, can collaborate with the hotel
industry to create and host large events to promote travel and boost hotel demand. As
high-involvement consumers are less sensitive to price increases, hosting large events
that attract a large population of highly involved consumers will benefit hotels. Hotel
managers should cooperate with event professionals to make events more relevant to
attendees, so as to promote consumers’ perceived price fairness and to reduce consumers’
perceived price unfairness.
In sum, hotels should consider how dynamic pricing affects consumers differently
depending on whether they have hedonic or utilitarian motivations, or, likewise, whether
their involvement in booking situations is high or low.
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5.5

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Several limitations of this dissertation should be considered when interpreting the
results for future studies. First, this research employed a sporting event and a weatherrelated event, representing a hedonic and a utilitarian situation, respectively. The
manipulation check was conducted for the second and third studies, but not for the first
study. However, these three studies use identical situations (sporting event and weatherrelated event) to manipulate a hedonic and a utilitarian situation and the manipulation
check for the second study verified that scenario situations (sporting event and weatherrelated event) could represent hedonic and utilitarian situations, respectively.
Second, although this study pioneers an examination of the bivariate measurement
for perceived fairness and unfairness in place of the traditional measurement using
bipolar scales, terminology used in traditional measurement such as fair, reasonable,
acceptable, justifiable for perceived fairness and unfair, unreasonable, unacceptable,
unacceptable, and unjustifiable for perceived unfairness were used. Cacioppo et al.
(1997) point out the need to minimize the possibility that participants may treat these
unipolar scales as bipolar scales when using antonym pairs. To minimize the carry-over
effect in the survey conducted for this study, participants were asked to recall the
scenario situation before they were asked to indicate the magnitude of their unfairness
perceptions. Nevertheless, the scales of perceived fairness and perceived unfairness were
used in antonym pairs. This may have opened the possibility that participants treated
these bivariate scales as bipolar scales. Therefore, future research should consider
choosing the wording more carefully to clearly treat the study as one-dimensional
bivariate scales rather than bipolar.
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Third, this research was designed to test consumers’ reactions to price increases in
a mid-scale hotel. Thus, it is not appropriate to apply the results of this research to
upscale or luxury hotel situations. Also, the study respondents were from a fairly specific
population: more than 80% of the respondents usually stayed at an economy hotel or a
mid-scale hotel. This limits generalization to the population and category of hotels
presented in this study.
Fourth, there are a variety of events that cause excess demand in the hotel market
such as sport ‘participation’ events (as opposed to ‘watching’ events), political events,
concerts, academic conference, business conventions, and so on. The various types of
events may have different characteristics and frame consumers’ trip motivations. It
would be recommended to test the application of the current research model to various
types of events.
Lastly, this research did not include negative behavioral intentions such as negative
word of mouth, complaining behavior, trip cancellation, etc. Since this study treats
perceived fairness and unfairness separately, it could be beneficial to extend the
relationship between fairness/unfairness and negative behavioral responses. The
independent constructs of fairness and unfairness could have results that are more
specific in the relationship with positive vs. negative behavioral responses.
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Appendix
Survey
Appendix A Survey
I forAthe
StudyI 1for Study 1
Dear Participants,
We are conducting a research project to examine how consumers respond to hotels’ room
rate increases. The results of this study would contribute significantly to the
understanding of consumer perceived unfairness towards hotel room rate pricing
practices.
The participants for this survey should be 18 years or older. The survey for this research
is voluntary, anonymous, and the participants can stop at any time if necessary. Further,
the participants can skip any questions, which they do not want to answer. It will take less
than 10 minute(s) to complete the enclosed survey.
All responses will be kept anonymous as well as confidential. Also, we will not use
responses for other purposes. Once again, we hope that you understand your participation
is critical to the success of this research. If you have any question or need more
information about this survey, please contact to Eunjoo Kang (kang126@purdue.edu) or
Dr. Chun-Hung(Hugo) Tang (tang14@purdue.edu).
Sincerely,
Eunjoo Kang

ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING YOUR RIGHTS AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT
MAY BE ADDRESSED TO THE IRB OFFICE AT THE PURDUE UNIVERSITY
(irb@purdue.edu).
I have read and understood the above consent form and desire of my own free will to
participate in this study.
o Yes
o No
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey
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We are interested in your perceptions towards the hotel industry's pricing practices as a
consumer.
Please read the following scenario carefully and respond to the questions by imagining
how you think that you would react in the described situation.
(Randomized selection algorithm: hedonic/utilitarian x magnitude of price increases)
Scenario – hedonic event
Imagine that you are planning a trip to watch your favorite professional football
team play. You plan to stay the night. You have identified a mid-scale hotel where
you want to stay. You know the average room rate for this hotel is $100.
Because of the football game, the hotel is expected to be fully booked on the night
of your stay. When you are trying to book a room, you find out the rate to be $120
/ $140 / $160 / $180 / $200 per night.

Scenario – utilitarian event
Imagine that your neighborhood area is flooded and your house has lost power due
to a storm. You are planning to stay in a hotel for the night to avoid the
inconvenience of staying at your flooded house. You have identified a mid-scale
hotel where you want to stay for the night. You know the average room rate for this
hotel is $100.

Because this hotel has not been affected by the storm, the hotel is expected to be
fully booked for the night of your stay. When you are trying to book a room, you
find out the rate to be $120 /$140 / $160 / $180 / $200 per night.

1. Do you think this given room rate is fair?
 Unfair
 Fair
If unfair is selected, then skip to question #2. If fair is selected, then skip to Question #3.
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2. How fair do you think this room rate change is?






Neutral
Somewhat Fair
Fair
Very fair
Extremely fair

3. How unfair do you think this room rate change is?






Neutral
Somewhat unfair
Unfair
Very unfair
Extremely unfair

4. What price you would consider to be fair? (Please adjust the slider)
______ US $

5. Would you book a room in this hotel under the described circumstance?






Very unlikely 1
2
3
4
Very likely 5
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6. What is the highest rate you would be willing to pay under the described circumstance?
(Please adjust the slider)
______ US $

7. How many times have you stayed at a hotel in the past 12 months?








No
1-2
3-4
5-6
7-8
9-10
More than 10

8. When staying at hotels in the past year, what type of hotel have you usually stayed?






Luxury hotels
Upscale hotels
Mid-scale hotels
Economy hotels
Budget hotels

9. How often do you use the Internet to book a hotel room?






Never
Less than a half of my trips
Half of my trips
More than half of my trips
Always
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10. What best describe your purpose of staying hotels in most of your trips?





Business trip
Leisure travel
Visiting family or friends
Other (Please specify) ____________________

11. Have you ever observed that hotels change room rate from time to time?
 Yes
 No

12. Are you familiar with the hotel industry's practice of dynamic pricing?






Very unfamiliar 1
2
3
4
Very familiar 5

13. In your opinion, which of the following are examples of a hotel's dynamic pricing
practice? (Select all that apply)
 At downtown hotels, weekday rate are more expensive than weekend rate.
 A hotel offers a lower room rate for groups than for an individual guest.
 A hotel offers one week staying package which is cheaper than daily charge for one
week.
 It is cheaper to book a hotel one month prior to the actual stay than one week prior to
the actual day.
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14. Would you agree that governments should control hotel room rates during natural
disasters or emergencies?






Very Unlikely 1
2
3
4
Very Likely 5

15. What is your gender?
 Male
 Female

16. What year were you born? ________
17. What is your current marital status?






Single
Married without children
Married with children
Divorced
Separated

18. What is the highest level of education you have completed?






High School or equivalent
2-year college degree
4-year college degree
Graduate / Professional degree
Other ____________________
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19. What is your current employment status? (Check all that apply)








Student
Employed (part-time)
Employed (full-time)
Unemployed
Retired
Homemaker
Other (Please specify) ____________________

20. What is your annual income?







Less than $20,000
$20,001 - $40,000
$40,001 - $60,000
$60,001 - $80,000
$80,001 - $100,000
More than $100,000

21-a. What situation did you imagine when you answer the questions?
 NFL (National Football League) game
 MLS (Major League Soccer) game
 College Football game
21-b. What situation did you imagine when you answer the questions?
 Earthquake
 Storm
 Tsunami
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22. Based on your understanding, the scenario is about:
 Price increases
 Price discounts
 Tourism package

Thank you for participating in this survey.
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Appendix
Survey
II 3for Study 2 and 3
Appendix B Survey
II for B
Study
2 and
Dear Participants,
We are conducting a research project to examine how consumers respond to hotels’ room
rate increases. The results of this study would contribute significantly to the
understanding of consumer perceived unfairness towards hotel room rate pricing
practices.
The participants for this survey should be 18 years or older. The survey for this research
is voluntary, anonymous, and the participants can stop at any time if necessary. Further,
the participants can skip any questions, which they do not want to answer. It will take less
than 10 minute(s) to complete the enclosed survey.
All responses will be kept anonymous as well as confidential. Also, we will not use
responses for other purposes. Once again, we hope that you understand your participation
is critical to the success of this research. If you have any question or need more
information about this survey, please contact to Eunjoo Kang (kang126@purdue.edu).
Sincerely,
Eunjoo Kang

ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING YOUR RIGHTS AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT
MAY BE ADDRESSED TO THE IRB OFFICE AT THE PURDUE UNIVERSITY
(irb@purdue.edu).
I have read and understood the above consent form and desire of my own free will to
participate in this study.
o Yes
o No
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey
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How many times have you stayed at a hotel in the past 12 months?













None
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
More than 10

When staying at hotels in the past year, what type of hotel have you usually stayed?






1 star hotel
2 star hotel
3 star hotel
4 star hotel
5 star hotel

How often do you use the Internet to book a hotel room?






Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Most of the Time
Always
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Which site have you visited most often when you book a hotel room?
 Hotel websites (Marriott.com, Hilton.com, Starwoodhotels.com, ihg.com,
holidayinn.com, etc)
 Opaque sites (Hotwire, Priceline, etc)
 Merchants sites (Expedia, Orbitz, etc)
 Credit card sites
 Others ____________________
What best describes your purpose of staying hotels in most of your trips?






Business trip
Leisure travel
Visiting family or friends
A combination of business & leisure
Other (Please specify) ____________________

Have you ever observed that hotels' room rates change from time to time?
 Yes
 No

Are you familiar with the hotel industry's practice of dynamic pricing?
Note: Dynamic pricing means adjusting the room rates based on the demand needs at a
particular situation.








Very Unfamiliar 1
2
3
4
5
6
Very Familiar7
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Which of the following situations have you observed or experienced? (Select all that
apply)
 At downtown hotels, weekday rate are more expensive than weekend rate.
 During a special event, hotel room rates are increased.
 A hotel offers a one week stay package which is cheaper than daily charge for one
week.
 It is cheaper to book a hotel one month prior to the actual stay than one week prior to
the actual day.
 When a city holds a professional sporting event, hotel room rates are increased.

We are interested in your perceptions towards the hotel industry's pricing practices as a
consumer. Please read the following scenario carefully and respond to the questions by
imagining how you think that you would react in the described situation.
** This survey includes a question to examine if you fully understand the given scenario
situation. If you do not understand the given situation, your answers are meaningless.
Therefore you may not be able to receive the survey completion code if you fail to the
validation question. Please read the following scenario and answer the questions
carefully. (Randomized selection algorithm: hedonic/utilitarian event)
Scenario – hedonic event
Imagine that you were planning a trip to watch your favorite professional sports teams
play. You were planning to stay in a hotel for the game night. You found a 3 star hotel
that satisfied your needs. Typically, you know that the average room rate for this type of
hotel is $100.
Due to the football game, all hotels were expected to be fully booked on the game
night.

Scenario – utilitarian event
Imagine that your neighborhood area were flooded and had power outage due to a
storm. You are planning to stay in a hotel for the night as an alternative
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housing. You found a 3 star hotel that satisfied your needs. Typically, you know
the average room rate for this type of hotel is $100.
Due to the storm, all hotels were expected to be fully booked for the night of your
stay.

How would you perceive staying in a hotel in this given situation?
Strongly
Disagree1

2

3

Neutral4

5

6

Strongly
Agree7

Effective















Helpful















Functional















Necessary















Practical















Fun















Exciting















Delightful















Thrilling















Enjoyable
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How would you feel about staying in a hotel in this given situation?
Strongly
Disagree
1

Neutral
2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Agree
7

It is very important to stay in a hotel
in this situation.



 



 



I would really want to stay in a hotel
in this situation.



 



 



Staying in a hotel in this situation
really matters to me.



 



 



What hotel room price would you consider fair in this given situation? Please adjust the
slider. ______ US$

What is the highest rate you would be willing to pay under the described circumstance?
Please adjust the slider. _____ US$
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Scenario – price increases [Randomized selection algorithm]
When you were trying to book a room, you find out the rate to be $120 /$140 / $160 /
$180/ $200 per night, which is $20 / $40 / $60 / $80 / $100 above the average.

Please remember the given situation, answer to the questions. Unless you could
remember the scenario correctly, your answers would be useless and you will not be able
to receive the completion code.

What situation did you envision when you answered the questions?







Sporting event
Storm
Leisure travel
Hurricane
Vacation
Music concerts

How would you feel about the increased room rate in this described situation?
Strongly
Disagree
1

Neutral
2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Agree
7

The increased room rate seems
reasonable.



 



 



The increased room rate seems
acceptable.



 



 



The increased room rate seems fair.



 



 



The increased room rate seems
justifiable.
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Based on the given scenario, the actual room rate was more expensive than average hotel
room rates by






$20
$40
$60
$80
$100

How would you feel about the increased room rate under the described situation?
Strongly
Disagree
1

Neutral
2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Agree
7

The increased room rate seems
unreasonable.



 



 



The increased room rate seems
unacceptable.



 



 



The increased room rate seems unfair.



 



 



The increased room rate seems
unjusfiable.



 



 



Would you book a room in this hotel under the described circumstance?
Strongly
Disagree
1

Neutral
2

3

4

5

6

Strongly
Agree
7

I would like to book a room at the given
room rate.



 



 



I would be willing to book this hotel in
the given situation.



 



 



I will book a room at this hotel.
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What is your gender?
 Male
 Female

What is your age? _______

What is your current marital status?





Single
Married
Divorced
Separated

Are you a student?
 Yes
 No

What is the highest level of education you have completed?






High School or equivalent
2-year college degree
4-year college degree
Graduate / Professional degree
Other ____________________
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What is your current employment status?







Employed (part-time)
Employed (full-time)
Unemployed
Retired
Homemaker
Other (Please specify) ____________________

What is your annual income?












Less than $20,000
$20,001 - $40,000
$40,001 - $60,000
$60,001 - $80,000
$80,001 - $100,000
$100,001 - $120,000
$120,001 - $140,000
$140,001 - $160,000
$160,001 - $180,000
$180,001 - $200,000
More than $200,001

In what state do you currently reside?

______

Based on your understanding, the scenario is about:
 Price increase
 Price discounts
 Tourism package

Thank you very much.

13

VITA
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